Asymmetry of Payoff Structure and Cooperative Behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Sheposh, John P.; Gallo, Philip S.

doi:10.1177/002200277301700208

Cited by 69 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Based on Pruitt's considerations on integrative solutions and the experimental results by Schellenberg (1964), Sheposh and Gallo (1973) and Talley (1974), occasional defection of low-type players in ASYM might be tolerated to a greater 34 A corresponding Fisher-Pitman permutation test yields (p ≤ 0.014; one-sided) for SYM vs. ASYM (p ≤ 0.072; one-sided) for HIGH vs. ASYM, (p ≤ 0.011; one-sided) for LOW vs. ASYM and (p ≤ 0.351; two-sided) for LOW vs. HIGH. extent than defection in the SYM treatments.…”

Section: Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second series of experiments did not yield statistically significant differences between symmetric and asymmetric games. Sheposh and Gallo (1973) ran symmetric and asymmetric experiments. The asymmetric game produced less cooperative behavior than the symmetric game (31.1% vs. 39.2%).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Asymmetry was created as in Sheposh and Gallo (1973) by multiplying the payoffs of one of the players by three. Treatments varied also with respect to information concerning others' payoffs, i.e.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

2007

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We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare. JEL-Classifications: C81, D70, C91.

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Section: Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

2007

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“…For example, several studies using the prisoner's dilemma paradigm (PDG) have found that negotiators with equal power were more likely to make cooperative choices, resulting in higher joint gains, than those with unequal power (McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, and Campos 1973;Sheposh and Gallo 1973). Power has also been explored by examining the effects of BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) on dyadic negotiations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

Mannix

Neale

1993

Group Decis Negot

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We investigate how a key structural aspect of negotiation--power--combines with aspiration level to affect the interaction pattern of negotiators. Conflicting research findings have revealed that in most cases negotiators with an equal balance of power reach agreements of higher joint gain than negotiators with an unequal power balance, but in some instances the opposite result has been found. We suggest that it is important to consider the interaction between the negotiators to explain these varying findings. We propose that when unequal power negotiators are able to reach agreements of high joint gain it is due to the efforts of the low power party. In addition, we argue that the low power player will be most likely to drive the search for a solution of high joint gain when he or she also has high aspirations. We tested these proposals in a market negotiation with integrative potential. To examine the pattern of negotiation, all offers and counter-offers were written. The results indicated that overall, equal power dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than unequal power dyads. Under unequal power, the hypothesis that higher joint outcomes would be obtained when the low power player had high aspirations received partial support. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that in unequal power dyads low power players would be responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain.In a recent review of dyadic negotiation, Neale and Northcraft (1991) have drawn from the decision theoretic perspective to develop behavioral negotiation theory. In doing so they have identified two major research streams: research concerning the contextual characteristics of the negotiation setting, and research concerning the negotiators themselves--their cognitions and interactions. The first stream includes structural variables such as power, deadlines, and integrative potential. The second research stream includes interaction processes such as influence tactics and communication, and negotiator cognitions such as planning, information processing, and individual differences. Neale and Northcraft (1991) suggest an integration of these two streams of research into the behavioral negotiation theory

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“…On the other hand, when subjects have di¤erent (asymmetric) information, they may feel a sense of unfairness, which decreases the incentive to coordinate. Indeed, several past studies show that asymmetric payo¤s reduce the rate of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game (Sheposh and Gallo [1973], Ahn et al, [2007], Beckenkamp, Henning-Schmidt, and MaierRigaud [2007]). These studies consider asymmetric payo¤s, not asymmetric information, but…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

Asako

Funaki

Ueda

et al. 2017

gwp

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Asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise, with symmetric information. In contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information. JEL codes:

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Asymmetry of Payoff Structure and Cooperative Behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cited by 69 publications

References 13 publications

Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

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