Asymmetry in structural adaptation: The differential impact of centralizing versus decentralizing team decision-making structures

Hollenbeck, John R.; Ellis, Aleksander P. J.; Humphrey, Stephen E.; Garza, Adela S.; Ilgen, Daniel R.

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.08.003

Cited by 79 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Its effect on knowledge integration, however, attracts much less attention. It has been agreed that centralized network is efficient for diffusion [46], because of the presence of the central nodes. They may accelerate the diffusion of best practice.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Individual irrationality, network structure, and collective intelligence: An agent‐based simulation approach

Liu

2015

Complexity

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An agent-based model is constructed to study the effects of individual irrationality and network structure on collective performance. We find that individual irrationality and network density are the most influential factors. Moderate degree of irrationality results in moderate knowledge unity and superior quality of knowledge; increasing network connections or decreasing average path length (APL) can promote quality of knowledge integration and knowledge unity. Furthermore, APL is more influential than clustering coefficient and centralization (CE). Less clustering may contribute to higher quality of knowledge integration, while higher CE may contribute to higher knowledge unity.

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Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Individual irrationality, network structure, and collective intelligence: An agent‐based simulation approach

Liu

2015

Complexity

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“…The team's defensive score started at 50,000 and decreased 1 or 2 points for every second an enemy was within the restricted region and highly restricted region, respectively. Consistent with past research (Ellis et al, 2003;Hollenbeck, Ellis, Humphrey, Garza, & Ilgen, 2011, we combined the accuracy and speed components into an overall measure of team performance by first calculating separate z-scores for the team's offensive score and defensive score. We then combined the two z-scores (r = .28, p < .05), using equal weighting, into an overall measure of team performance.…”

Section: Goal Setting In Teams 17mentioning

confidence: 99%

Goal setting in teams: The impact of learning and performance goals on process and performance

Nahrgang

DeRue

Hollenbeck

et al. 2013

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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“…However, if the R-treatment is preceded by when employees are not monitored, the perception could be different. This is due to the difficulty faced by the employees to adapt to the new and more team-based structure as what emphasized by the Structural Adaptation Theory (Hollenbeck et al, 2011).…”

Section: Results From the Surveymentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishment as a Price to Pay

Siang¹

2012

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Management meted out punishment to enforce rules and encourage adherence. However, the effectiveness depended on how the employees perceive and interpret the policy. Therefore, it was uncertain how to best achieve the target. The paper tested employees' behavioral responses in two conditions, 1) when employees had to pay fines to employer and 2) when employees had to pay fines to co-workers. Condition one was a typical deterrence policy implemented to punish misconduct in an organization, and condition two tested the behavioral responses to distributive outcomes. Questionnaire was distributed to these employees to investigate perception. The experimental results indicated that employees responded differently to the two conditions, misconduct was significantly reduced in condition two but not in condition one. While employees agreed that the implementation was fair in the two conditions, they did not agree on the punishment outcomes in condition two. The employees perceived paying fines to employer was more acceptable than paying fines to co-workers. Accounting for social norms in the implementation was more successful than formal deterrence. IntroductionOrganizations enforce rules and regulations to align the interest of the employees and the organization.While there is no question that adherence is critical to the smooth functioning of an organization (Bell et al., 2002;Tyler & Blader, 2005), the strategies an organization uses to best achieve the target is always very elusive. The present paper compares two strategies to achieve adherence; the command and control approach and self-regulatory approach.In command and control approach, organizations enforce rules through incentives to encourage adherence and sanctions to discourage misbehavior (GomezMejia & Balkin, 1992;Lauver et al., 2009;Ames et al., 2000). It is based on the view that rule-following is a function of cost and benefits. However, its efficacy has been questioned and it has consistently been found to have only minor influence on adherence (Markell, 2000;MacCoun, 1993). The self-regulatory approach represents an alternative approach that focuses on employee's intrinsic motivations (Tyler & Blader, 2005).It is based on the employees' intrinsic desire to follow organizational rules. Such desire is linked to the em- There is lack of direct field evidence of the relation be- Punishment as a Price to PayReceived:Accepted : 2011 2012 09 03 20 22 ABSTRACT C93, D03, J33, L23

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Asymmetry in structural adaptation: The differential impact of centralizing versus decentralizing team decision-making structures

Cited by 79 publications

References 20 publications

Individual irrationality, network structure, and collective intelligence: An agent‐based simulation approach

Individual irrationality, network structure, and collective intelligence: An agent‐based simulation approach

Goal setting in teams: The impact of learning and performance goals on process and performance

Punishment as a Price to Pay

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