Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: Group buying vs. individual purchasing

Yan, Yingchen; Zhao, Ruiqing; Lan, Yanyan

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2017.02.025

Cited by 61 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Chen and Roma (2011) explore a manufacturer provides a quantity discount contract to two competing retailers under group buying. Furthermore, Yan et al (2017) extend the literature to study two asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences under a quantity discount contract. The second part mainly focuses on the price discount contract.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The second stream of our research is also related to discount contracts in supply chain management. Researches on discount contracts are mainly divided into two parts: quantity discount contract (Shin and Benton, 2007;Zhou, 2007;Chen and Roma, 2011;Yan et al, 2017;Roshanak and Joseph, 2018) and price discount contract (Bernstein and Federgruen, 2005;Cai et al, 2009;Li et al, 2016). Shin and Benton (2007) study a quantity discount contract under uncertain demand conditions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To encourage downstream manufacturers to make technology investments, suppliers usually offer manufacturers a wholesale price discount contract (Zhou, 2007;Cai et al, 2009;Yan et al, 2017). For example, LG who is a screen supplier, accepts around downstream-manufacturer-Apple's $1.75-2.62 billion investments for expanding the capacity of displays.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

et al. 2021

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Cooperation between upstream suppliers and downstream manufacturers in technology investment is a popular way to improve production technology for reducing suppliers' production costs of key components. Technology investments undertaken by manufacturers and wholesale price discount contract provided by suppliers have an important impact on their cooperation. This paper explores whether a supplier should cooperate with two downstream competing manufacturers to accept their technology investments to reduce the supplier's production cost of a key component. Specifically, we consider the following three cooperation strategies: the supplier does not accept manufacturers' technology investments, only accepts one manufacturer's technology investment and accepts both manufacturers' technology investments. Our results demonstrate that the wholesale price discount contract and the technology investment can enhance the profits of the supplier and two manufacturers when the discount degree is low. Further, we conclude that when the discount degree is relatively low or when the discount degree and the technology investment efficiency are relatively high, the supplier's optimal cooperation strategy with two manufacturers is to accept both manufacturers' technology invest-

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

et al. 2021

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“…Keyhanian et al [15] incorporate the composite product concept that is considering a demand group for consumers who want to buy both complementary products. Yan et al [32] use a similar concept of individual and composite purchasing in an asymmetric setting with two retailers and one supplier. Choi [7] discusses different Bertrand and Stackelberg game structures with market powers for linear and nonlinear demands.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

On pricing and bundling decisions for stackelberg games in parallel channels of substitutable composites

2021

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The paper describes competition within a supply network with parallel distribution channels. Each supply chain in the network is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Manufacturers sell two complementary products to the retailers, who then deliver to the end consumers. All players can bundle or not bundle their products assuming that the retail market presents the products in a mixed bundling setting. The motivation of this study is to mainly analyze the impact of cost reduction via manufacturers, on how the whole supply network will behave. We have modeled and solved partly and fully sequential game structures well known as Bertrand and Stackelberg games, where the preceding movers are considered to have more market power. Mathematical and numerical analyses reveal interesting propositions and managerial insights for decision makers who are practicing cost cutting strategies. The combination of diﬀerent ordinal structures have led to exact mathematical comparisons among 24 games. Results indicate both manufacturers and retailers are better oﬀ with simultaneous pricing games which promotes the concept of coordination through layer and channels of the network. Cost reduction with compensation increases payoﬀs, if only applied by the manufacturer whose complementary products’ manufacturing costs are more distanced. It is also shown that retailers enjoy a retail advantage on one product at its best when playing retailer leading Stackelberg games.

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“…With regard to studies about the information asymmetry in the supply chain, most focus on the cost structure [5,8,17] and demand information [15,38]. Supply contracts including quantity discount contract [6], wholesale price contract [30] and buyback contract [21], under these information asymmetric situations have been studied extensively to help achieve supply chain coordination [37].…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordination Under Information Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: Designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses

Zhao

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper studies the issue of demand information asymmetry in an elderly healthcare service (EHS) system represented by a two-echelon elderly healthcare service supply chain (EHSSC) comprising an elderly service integrator (ESI) and a service provider (ESP). The goal of the ESI is to decide on how much service capacity is required for placing orders to the ESP, who directly serves the customers. Considering discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses, a centralised model with symmetric demand information and decentralised models with asymmetric demand information are developed to analyse the optimal ordering decisions and discuss the influence of information asymmetry. Furthermore, option contracts are applied to help coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric demand information based on different demand distribution statuses. Optimal option contract menus are designed for the ESP to promote the information sharing. Results show that the option contract can coordinate the EHSSC with asymmetric demand information under both discrete and continuous demand distribution statuses. The exercise price will be higher under lower demand information than that under higher demand information and the transfer payment will be less under lower demand information than that under higher demand information. Moreover, although the ESI has demand information superiority and can make use of opportunistic behaviour to maximise its own profit, the ESP as the leader can design the option contract to incentive the ESI to achieve true information sharing, and even obtain nearly all of the channel profit.

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Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: Group buying vs. individual purchasing

Cited by 61 publications

References 39 publications

Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

On pricing and bundling decisions for stackelberg games in parallel channels of substitutable composites

Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: Designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses

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