Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Dionne, Georges; St‐Amour, Pascal; Vencatachellum, Désiré

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1311324

Cited by 11 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 41 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Thus, moral hazard may itself produce the positive coverage–risk correlation that adverse selection may be expected to produce. Accordingly, although the finding of such a correlation is consistent with adverse selection, it is also consistent with, and may be fully due to, moral hazard, as Dionne, St‐Amour, and Vencatachellum (Forthcoming) stress. We discuss empirical attempts to disentangle adverse section and moral hazard in the section “.”…”

supporting

confidence: 55%

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Cohen¹,

Siegelman²

2010

Journal of Risk and Insurance

306

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage-risk prediction of adverse selection theory-that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage-risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage-risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2010.

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 55%

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Cohen¹,

Siegelman²

2010

Journal of Risk and Insurance

306

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Dionne et al. () extend the empirical model developed by Hong and Shum () and derive the empirical implications of the presence of an informed participant in an English auction with private and common value. In their model, the informed player makes an overall valuation because the common value cannot be distinguished from the private value.…”

Section: Acquisitions and Information Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dionne et al. () conclude that the presence of an informed participant prompts more aggressive offers by uninformed players. They test their theoretical predictions on a sample of slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1834.…”

Section: Acquisitions and Information Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

Dionne

Haye

Bergerès

2015

Canadian J of Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:Our objective is to test the influence of information asymmetry between potential buyers on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions with asymmetric information. The theory of dynamic auctions with private values predicts that more informed bidders should pay a lower price for an acquisition. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We hypothesize that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Information asymmetry between participants is shown to influence the premium paid. Blockholders pay a much lower conditional premium than do other buyers (around 70% lower). Tests also show that the characteristics of the target, specifically the runup, sales growth and size, affect the premium. The size of the target relative to the buyer, the choice of a public takeover bid and the hostility of the bid are also influential.

show abstract

“…The presence of the variable is not necessarily exogenous in equation (1). It is often better to instrument this variable (See Dionne et al, 2009, and Rowell, 2011, for more details).…”

Section: General Tests For Residual Asymmetric Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance

Dionne

Michaud²,

Pinquet

2013

Research in Transportation Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In other words, is there residual asymmetric information in observed distributions of accidents and infractions? We answer these questions in this chapter by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical results based on various data and methodologies. We present recent tests related to the identification of residual asymmetric information in road safety management and in automobile insurance contracting. We also propose a theoretical analysis of the foundations of point-record driver's licenses observed around the world.

show abstract

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Cited by 11 publications

References 41 publications

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About