Asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of emergency cooperative social networks for magnitude emergencies: Evidence from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in China

Abstract

Emergency cooperative social networks (ECSNs) play a very important role in emergency management for magnitude emergencies in China recently. Based on the data set of cooperative fight against COVID-19 of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in China, using social network analysis (SNA) and asymmetric evolutionary game model, this study finds that the asymmetry between regions is comprehensively determined by resource endowment, administrative level, geographical distance, regional vulnerability, political pressure and other factors; vertical control is still the main operating mechanism of ECSNs; network derivation is caused by the superposition of multiple factors, of which political factors are very important, and asymmetry may become an obstacle.

Forecasting law enforcement frequency of internet+ coal mine safety supervision

“…Besides, SNA has been applied to identify the key risk factors in construction projects in high-density urban areas (Yuan et al , 2018), the construction phase of the metro (Lu and Zhang, 2020) and green redevelopment projects of industrial brownfields (Zhang et al , 2023). Moreover, Nan and Wang (2022) conducted SNA and found that the asymmetry of emergency cooperative social networks between regions was comprehensively determined by multiple factors, of which political factors were very important. Additionally, SNA expanded the approaches to examining the effectiveness of interproject communication management (Plokhov et al , 2016) and e-business standards consortia (Choi et al , 2019).…”