Service providers may vary service quality depending on whether they work alone or provide the service simultaneously with a partner. The latter case resembles a prisoner's dilemma [1][2][3][4] , in which one provider may try to reap the benefits of the interaction without providing the service. Here we present a game-theory model based on the marginal value theorem 5 , which predicts that as long as the client determines the duration, and the providers cooperate towards mutual gain, service quality will increase in the pair situation. This prediction is consistent with field observations and with an experiment on cleaning mutualism, in which stable male-female pairs of the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus repeatedly inspect client fish jointly. Cleaners cooperate by eating ectoparasites 6 off clients but actually prefer to cheat and eat client mucus 7 . Because clients often leave in response to such cheating, the benefits of cheating can be gained by only one cleaner during a pair inspection. In both data sets, the increased service quality during pair inspection was mainly due to the smaller females behaving significantly more cooperatively than their larger male partners. In contrast, during solitary inspections, cleaning behaviour was very similar between the sexes. Our study highlights the importance of incorporating interactions between service providers to make more quantitative predictions about cooperation between species.Many cooperative interactions can be seen as an exchange of goods, services or commodities between two classes of traders [8][9][10] . Here we investigated traders that provide a service to a second class of traders, such as an ant partner species-for example, lycaenid butterfly larvae-providing a sugary solution to ants 11 , rhizobial bacteria fixing nitrogen for leguminous plants 12 or cleaner fish removing ectoparasites from client reef fish 13 . We have used the last example as our model system. Cleaners prefer the mucus of some client species more than gnathiid isopods 7 , the most commonly found ectoparasites of reef fishes 14 . Clients use various actions to make cleaners forage against their preference 15,16 , the simplest form of control being to terminate the interaction by swimming off in response to a cheating bite 17 . Adult cleaners often live in pairs of a male and the largest female in his harem 18 and they commonly inspect larger clients simultaneously. Pair inspections result in cleaners facing a problem: a visiting client may leave after a cheat, even though only one cleaner was responsible for the cheating whereas the second cleaner cooperated. Hence, the cooperative cleaner loses a foraging opportunity owing to its partner's action, whereas the cheating cleaner gains a bite of mucus. We explored both mathematically and empirically how these pay-off asymmetries influence the service quality provided in paired compared with solitary inspections.We explored a game in which one class of individuals provides a service (cleaners remove ectoparasites) to a second clas...