AStERISK: Auction-based Shared Economy ResolutIon Markets for Blockchain Platforms

Sonnino, Alberto; Król, Michał; Tasiopoulos, Argyrios G.; Psaras, Ioannis

doi:10.14722/diss.2019.230001

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Another countermeasure involves, each bidder being required to send a deposit more than or equal to the bidding price. We call this method the "simple deposit method" and has been widely employed, e.g., [1], [8], [9], [15]- [18], [27]- [29], [31], [32]. However, even if the fund binding property is provided, the maximum bidding price can be revealed.…”

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealedbid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides fund binding, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al,. CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To ensure the rationality of the task allocation scheme. Some scholars have put forward the scheme of combining Blockchain and auction mode to realize resource allocation [29], which has also been applied to crowdsourcing [30], but in the end, unfair task allocation and reward allocation may be implemented in an untraceable way. This is mainly due to the limited computing scale of Blockchain, and a large number of computing processes are still executed off-chain.…”

Section: Figure 1 Comparison Between Centralized Platform and Decentrmentioning

confidence: 99%

TSWCrowd: A Decentralized Task-Select-Worker Framework on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing

2020

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“…Auctions were introduce to blockchain on two frontiers: 1) Blockchain resource management [6], [7] and 2) Blockchain-based applications such as finance [8]- [11], and crowdsensing [12]. These applications were proposed to address the management and trust challenges in centralized auctions.…”

Section: B Blockchain and Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [11], a Vickrey auction is implement on blockchain for exchanging storage while maintaining users' privacy. Users' privacy is denoted by the sealed-bids which are revealed once the bidding interval is over.…”

Section: B Blockchain and Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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ABCrowd An Auction Mechanism on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing

et al. 2020

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In this paper, a fully distributed auction-blockchain-based crowdsourcing framework is proposed-ABCrowd. In a typical crowdsourcing framework, independent workers compete to be allocated requesters' tasks. These workers advertise their costs to the centralized platform, which then decides the final allocation of tasks. While performing the allocation, centralized platforms face two main challenges: 1) how to ensure trusted execution for the allocation of tasks, and 2) how to motivate workers to declare their truthful costs. To address these challenges, ABCrowd proposes to run the crowdsourcing platform entirely on Ethereum Blockchain while incorporating auctions. Blockchain and smart contracts guarantee trusted execution for the allocation through autonomous and transparent on-Chain execution. ABCrowd uses the Repeated-Single-Minded Bidder (R-SMB) auction mechanism, which motivates workers to bid truthfully before allocating them and calculating their payments. R-SMB is an approximation of the optimized off-Chain Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in terms of maximized profit. It entails repeating the Single-Minded Bidder (SMB) auction mechanism to meet the allocation requirement of crowdsourcing applications. ABCrowd is implemented and evaluated using Solidity on a private Ethereum Blockchain, where a real publicly available dataset is used. The proposed on-Chain R-SMB auction mechanism is compared to the off-Chain VCG mechanism, where the results show that R-SMB provides similar performance to VCG in terms of the average number of allocated tasks. Furthermore, R-SMB outperforms VCG in workers' travelled distance and requesters' costs, at a low execution cost. INDEX TERMS Crowdsourcing, blockchain, smart contracts, auction.

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AStERISK: Auction-based Shared Economy ResolutIon Markets for Blockchain Platforms

Cited by 4 publications

References 30 publications

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

TSWCrowd: A Decentralized Task-Select-Worker Framework on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing

ABCrowd An Auction Mechanism on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing

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