Associative-Commutative Deducibility Constraints

Bursuc, Sergiu; Comon-Lundh, Hubert; Delaune, Stéphanie

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70918-3_54

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…This procedure has then been used when the attacker is enhanced with the ability to compare the length of messages . Regarding equational theories, [Bursuc et al, 2007] propose a procedure for constraint systems with an associative and commutative function symbol (and no other symbols). decide the equivalence of constraint systems for several group theories.…”

Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols: A Tutorial

Cortier

Kremer

2014

FNT in Programming Languages

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International audienceSecurity protocols are distributed programs that aim at securing communications by the means of cryptography. They are for instance used to secure electronic payments, home banking and more recently electronic elections. Given The financial and societal impact in case of failure, and the long history of design flaws in such protocol, formal verification is a necessity. A major difference from other safety critical systems is that the properties of security protocols must hold in the presence of an arbitrary adversary. The aim of this paper is to provide a tutorial to some modern approaches for formally modeling protocols, their goals and automatically verifying them

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Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols: A Tutorial

Cortier

Kremer

2014

FNT in Programming Languages

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“…Starting with Millen and Shmatikov's paper [Millen and Shmatikov 2001] many results (e.g. [Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov 2003;Baudet 2005;Bursuc et al 2007]) have been obtained and several tools (e.g. [Corin and Etalle 2002]) have been developed within this framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deciding security properties for cryptographic protocols. application to key cycles

Comon-Lundh¹,

Cortier

Zălinescu

2010

ACM Trans. Comput. Logic

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There is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols. In this paper, we revisit and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions. We use a, now standard, deducibility constraint formalism for modeling security protocols. Our first contribution is to give a simple set of constraint simplification rules, that allows to reduce any deducibility constraint system to a set of solved forms, representing all solutions (within the bound on sessions).As a consequence, we prove that deciding the existence of key cycles is NP-complete for a bounded number of sessions. The problem of key-cycles has been put forward by recent works relating computational and symbolic models. The so-called soundness of the symbolic model requires indeed that no key cycle (e.g., enc(k, k)) ever occurs in the execution of the protocol. Otherwise, stronger security assumptions (such as KDM-security) are required.We show that our decision procedure can also be applied to prove again the decidability of authentication-like properties and the decidability of a significant fragment of protocols with timestamps.

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Towards an Automatic Analysis of Web Service Security

Chevalier

Lugiez

Rusinowitch

2007

Frontiers of Combining Systems

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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceWeb services send and receive messages in XML syntax with some parts hashed, encrypted or signed, according to the WS-Security standard. We have introduced a model to formally describe the protocols that underly these services, their security properties and the rewriting attacks they might be subject to. Unlike other protocol models (in symbolic analysis) ours can handle non-deterministic receive/send actions and unordered sequence of XML nodes. Then to detect the attacks we have to consider the services as combining multiset operators and cryptographic ones and we have to solve specific satisfiability problems in the combined theory. By an extension of the combination techniques we obtain a decision procedure for insecurity of Web services with messages built using encryption, signature, and other cryptographic primitives. This combination technique allows one to decide insecurity in a modular way by reducing the associated constraint solving problems to problems in simpler theories.Nous introduisons un modèle abstrait des services web qui permet d'exprimer les attaques par réécriture. Nous proposons un algorithme pour détecter ce type de vulnérabilité

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Associative-Commutative Deducibility Constraints

Cited by 7 publications

References 21 publications

Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols: A Tutorial

Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols: A Tutorial

Deciding security properties for cryptographic protocols. application to key cycles

Towards an Automatic Analysis of Web Service Security

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