Assessment of the Proliferation of Certain Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Response to Section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017

Nacouzi, George; Williams, J D; Dolan, Brian; Stickells, Anne; Luckey, D.; Ludwig, Colin; Jia, Xu; Shokh, Yuliya; Gerstein, Daniel M.; Decker, Michael H.

doi:10.7249/rr2369

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are widely used by the U.S., Chinese, and Russian militaries, as well as by numerous nation states and regional actors (Dillow 2016). The relatively low cost and low technology barrier to entry for shortrange UAVs has enabled the rapid proliferation of UAV technologies (Nacouzi et al 2018) for use individually, in groups, or in large swarms. Long-range UAVs with satellite-based communications are more likely to be used by countries with extensive military capabilities.…”

Section: Unmanned Aerial Vehiclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Robots for the Battlefield: State of the Art

Swett

Hahn

Llorens

2021

Robotics, AI, and Humanity

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There is currently a global arms race for the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and unmanned robotic systems that are empowered by AI (AI-robots). This paper examines the current use of AI-robots on the battlefield and offers a framework for understanding AI and AI-robots. It examines the limitations and risks of AI-robots on the battlefield and posits the future direction of battlefield AI-robots. It then presents research performed at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) related to the development, testing, and control of AI-robots, as well as JHU/APL work on human trust of autonomy and developing self-regulating and ethical robotic systems. Finally, it examines multiple possible future paths for the relationship between humans and AI-robots.

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Section: Unmanned Aerial Vehiclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Robots for the Battlefield: State of the Art

Swett

Hahn

Llorens

2021

Robotics, AI, and Humanity

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“…Nowadays unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are also being employed in combat and can carry various missiles, like the “MQ-8B Fire Scout” used by USA ( Wesson & Humphreys, 2013 ). Even new fighter jets have been converted and used as fully autonomous UAVs ( Nacouzi et al, 2018 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On GPS spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions

Khan

Mohsin

Iqbal³

2021

PeerJ Computer Science

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Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAVs, Drones), initially known only for their military applications, are getting increasingly popular in the civil sector as well. Over the military canvas, drones have already proven themselves as a potent force multiplier through unmanned, round-the-clock, long-range and high-endurance missions for surveillance, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and even armed combat applications. With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), commercial deployments of drones are also growing exponentially, ranging from cargo and taxi services to agriculture, disaster relief, risk assessment and monitoring of critical infrastructures. Irrespective of the deployment sector, drones are often entrusted to conduct safety, time and liability critical tasks, thus requiring secure, robust and trustworthy operations. In contrast, the rise in UAVs’ demand, coupled with market pressure to reduce size, weight, power and cost (SwaP-C) parameters, has caused vendors to often ignore security aspects, thus inducing serious safety and security threats. As UAVs rely on Global Positioning System (GPS) for positioning and navigation, they can fall prey to GPS jamming and spoofing attacks. The vulnerability of GPS to spoofing has serious implications for UAVs, as victim drones using civil GPS can be misdirected or even completely hijacked for malicious intents, as already demonstrated in several academic research efforts using commercially available GPS spoofing hardware. Beside UAVs, GPS spoofing attacks are equally applicable to other GPS-dependent platforms, including manned aircraft, ground vehicles, and cellular systems. This paper conducts a comprehensive review of GPS spoofing threats, with a special focus on their applicability over UAVs and other GPS-dependent mobile platforms. It presents a novel taxonomy of GPS spoofing attacks and critically analyzes different spoofing techniques based upon placement of spoofing device, attack stealthiness, attack methodologies, and objectives of the attacker. We also discuss some of the recent experiments from open literature which utilized commercially available hardware for successfully conducting spoofing attacks.

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