Assessment of Ebola virus disease preparedness in the WHO South-East Asia Region

Vong, Sirenda; Samuel, Rekha; Gould, P. L.; Sakka, Hammam El; Rana, Bardan J.; Pinyowiwat, Vason; Bezbaruah, Supriya; Ofrin, Roderico

doi:10.2471/blt.16.174441

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…However, the risk of in-flight transmission of influenza appears to be higher than that of SARS-CoV-2. The transmission rate (secondary attack rate) in our study was 3.69% while secondary attack rate for influenza in in-flight passengers ranged between 4.3% and 7.5% based on most reports [26,27].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 49%

In-flight transmission cluster of COVID-19: a retrospective case series

Yang

Shen²,

Shi³

et al. 2020

Infectious Diseases

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Background: No data is available about in-flight transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Here, we report an in-flight transmission cluster of COVID-19 and describe the clinical characteristics of these patients. Methods: After a flight, laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 was reported in 12 patients. Ten patients were admitted to the designated hospital. Data was collected from 25th January to 28th February 2020. Clinical information was retrospectively collected. Results: All patients were passengers, and none were flight attendants. The median age was 33 years, and 70% were females. None was admitted to intensive care unit, and no patients died up to 28th February. The median incubation period was 3.0 days and time from onset of illness to hospital admission was 2 days. The most common symptom was fever. Two patients were asymptomatic and had normal chest CT scan during hospital stay. On admission, initial RT-PCR was positive in 9 patients, and initial chest CT was positive in half of the patients. The median lung 'total severity score' of chest CT was 6. 'Crazy-paving' pattern, pleural effusion, and ground-glass nodules were seen. Conclusion: There is potential for COVID-19 transmission in aeroplanes, but the symptoms were mild in our patients. Passengers and attendants must be protected during flights.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 49%

In-flight transmission cluster of COVID-19: a retrospective case series

Yang

Shen²,

Shi³

et al. 2020

Infectious Diseases

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“… 10 A WHO assessment on Ebola virus preparedness in WHO Southeast Asia region showed that multilevel and multisectoral collaboration and coordination structures were most advanced aspects in preparedness, as a result from pandemic preparedness. 11 Van Beneden et al 12 also describes US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention outreach to clinicians, including assisting clinicians managing patients with Ebola, sharing updated information with the clinical community, and coordinating information sharing among clinicians managing patients with Ebola in the United States and Europe. We conclude that the multisectoral approach for EVD preparedness has been experienced widely.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ebola Preparedness in the Netherlands: The Need for Coordination Between the Public Health and the Curative Sector

Swaan

Öry

Schol

et al. 2018

Journal of Public Health Management and Practice

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Context:During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2015, close cooperation between the curative sector and the public health sector in the Netherlands was necessary for timely identification, referral, and investigation of patients with suspected Ebola virus disease (EVD).Objective:In this study, we evaluated experiences in preparedness among stakeholders of both curative and public health sectors to formulate recommendations for optimizing preparedness protocols. Timeliness of referred patients with suspected EVD was used as indicator for preparedness.Design:In focus group sessions and semistructured interviews, experiences of curative and public health stakeholders about the regional and national process of preparedness and response were listed. Timeliness recordings of all referred patients with suspected EVD (13) were collected from first date of illness until arrival in the referral academic hospital.Results:Ebola preparedness was considered extensive compared with the risk of an actual patient, however necessary. Regional coordination varied between regions. More standardization of regional preparation and operational guidelines was requested, as well as nationally standardized contingency criteria, and the National Centre for Infectious Disease Control was expected to coordinate the development of these guidelines. For the timeliness of referred patients with suspected EVD, the median delay between first date of illness until triage was 2.0 days (range: 0-10 days), and between triage and arrival in the referral hospital, it was 5.0 hours (range: 2-7.5 hours). In none of these patients Ebola infection was confirmed.Conclusions:Coordination between the public health sector and the curative sector needs improvement to reduce delay in patient management in emerging infectious diseases. Standardization of preparedness and response practices, through guidelines for institutional preparedness and blueprints for regional and national coordination, is necessary, as preparedness for emerging infectious diseases needs a multidisciplinary approach overarching both the public health sector and the curative sector. In the Netherlands a national platform for preparedness is established, in which both the curative sector and public health sector participate, in order to implement the outcomes of this study.

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“…Similarly, all countries assessed by data from the annual reporting self-reported the existence of IHR multisectoral committees, but the mission found multisectoral committees in only 25% of these countries. This finding provided evidence that the self-reporting of IHR capacities might not accurately reflect the actual capacities in some countries ( 8 , 9 ).…”

Section: Who Joint External Evaluation Toolmentioning

confidence: 97%

Joint External Evaluation—Development and Scale-Up of Global Multisectoral Health Capacity Evaluation Process

Bell¹,

Tappero²,

Ijaz³

et al. 2017

Emerg. Infect. Dis.

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The Joint External Evaluation (JEE), a consolidation of the World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the Global Health Security Agenda country assessment tool, is an objective, voluntary, independent peer-to-peer multisectoral assessment of a country’s health security preparedness and response capacity across 19 IHR technical areas. WHO approved the standardized JEE tool in February 2016. The JEE process is wholly transparent; countries request a JEE and are encouraged to make its findings public. Donors (e.g., member states, public and private partners, and other public health institutions) can support countries in addressing identified JEE gaps, and implementing country-led national action plans for health security. Through July 2017, 52 JEEs were completed, and 25 more countries were scheduled across WHO’s 6 regions. JEEs facilitate progress toward IHR 2005 implementation, thereby building trust and mutual accountability among countries to detect and respond to public health threats.

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Assessment of Ebola virus disease preparedness in the WHO South-East Asia Region

Cited by 16 publications

References 2 publications

In-flight transmission cluster of COVID-19: a retrospective case series

In-flight transmission cluster of COVID-19: a retrospective case series

Ebola Preparedness in the Netherlands: The Need for Coordination Between the Public Health and the Curative Sector

Joint External Evaluation—Development and Scale-Up of Global Multisectoral Health Capacity Evaluation Process

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