New Directions in the Philosophy of Science 2014
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_29
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Assessing the Status of the Common Cause Principle

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Cited by 3 publications
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“…The difficulty in giving a definite answer to this question is that the Common Cause Principle has metaphysical character: it is a strictly universal claim containing two general existential statements. Standard arguments well known from the history of philosophy show that such general claims can be neither verified nor falsified conclusively; thus, as it was argued in [10] (Chapters 1 and 10) and [17], the only option one has when it comes to the problem of assessing the epistemic status of the principle is to have a look at the best available evidence relevant for the principle and see whether they are in harmony with the principle or not. Such evidence is provided by the empirical sciences.…”
Section: Common Cause Completability and The Common Cause Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The difficulty in giving a definite answer to this question is that the Common Cause Principle has metaphysical character: it is a strictly universal claim containing two general existential statements. Standard arguments well known from the history of philosophy show that such general claims can be neither verified nor falsified conclusively; thus, as it was argued in [10] (Chapters 1 and 10) and [17], the only option one has when it comes to the problem of assessing the epistemic status of the principle is to have a look at the best available evidence relevant for the principle and see whether they are in harmony with the principle or not. Such evidence is provided by the empirical sciences.…”
Section: Common Cause Completability and The Common Cause Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…A possible (and very natural [10] (Chapters 1 and 10), [17]) line of reasoning aimed at assessing the Common Cause Principle in this spirit is the following: Suppose a theory T applies a non-classical probability theory (L, φ) to describe phenomena and predicts correlation between elements a, b in L such that, according to T , there is no (cannot be) a direct causal connection between a and b. The first question one would want to ask then: Is there a common cause c in L of the correlation between a and b?…”
Section: Common Cause Completability and The Common Cause Principlementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, rather than trying to verify or falsify the Common Cause Principle, one should settle on a more modest goal: to look at our best, confirmed scientific theories to see whether they offer evidence in favor or against the truth of the Common Cause Principle (for a more detailed discussions of this point see [11][Chapter 10] and [22]). It is in connection with such an evaluation of the Common Cause Principle that common cause closedness becomes relevant: If a probabilistic theory is such that the probability theory it employs to describe phenomena is common cause closed then that theory is a strong candidate for being a confirming evidence in favor of the Common Cause Principle.…”
Section: Common Cause Closedness and The Common Cause Principlementioning
confidence: 99%