Assessing the Risk of Democratic Reversal in the United States: A Reply to Kurt Weyland

Abstract

By replying to Kurt Weyland’s (2020) comparative study of populism, we revisit optimistic perspectives on the health of American democracy in light of existing evidence. Relying on a set-theoretical approach, Weyland concludes that populists succeed in subverting democracy only when institutional weakness and conjunctural misfortune are observed jointly in a polity, thereby conferring on the United States immunity to democratic reversal. We challenge this conclusion on two grounds. First, we argue that the focus on institutional dynamics neglects the impact of the structural conditions in which institutions are embedded, such as inequality, racial cleavages, and changing political attitudes among the public. Second, we claim that endogeneity, coding errors, and the (mis)use of Boolean algebra raise questions about the accuracy of the analysis and its conclusions. Although we are skeptical of crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as an adequate modeling choice, we replicate the original analysis and find that the paths toward democratic backsliding and continuity are both potentially compatible with the United States.

Why US Democracy Trumps Populism: Comparative Lessons Reconsidered

“…Moreover, none of the institutional weaknesses that I invoked reflected prior instances of democratic breakdown—especially not the populist suffocation of democracy, my dependent variable. Consequently, there is no endogeneity problem—and no reason to eliminate these institutional weaknesses from the analysis, as do López and Luna (2021, 425).…”

“…López and Luna (2021) criticize the institutionalist dimensions of my theory and call for the inclusion of cultural and structural factors that—they claim—make the United States significantly more vulnerable to democratic breakdown. Specifically, López and Luna (2021, 424) question my argument that parliamentarism has an inherent institutional weakness in allowing for “easy changeability.” However, attenuated checks and balances do facilitate transformations, which can erode democracy. Accordingly, Hungary’s Orbán managed to smother democracy in perfectly legal ways (Scheppele 2018, 549–52), an unlikely feat under presidentialism (Brewer-Carías 2010).…”

“…López and Luna (2021, 424) also are concerned that my invocation of the well-documented institutional weaknesses of many presidential systems in Latin America (Brinks, Levitsky, and Murillo 2020) suffers from endogeneity. Aware of this risk (Weyland 2020, 392), I scored institutional weakness for the time before a populist’s election (see online appendix of Weyland 2020, p. 3).…”

“…Just when I thought that after 30 years in the profession, I finally had correctly predicted an outcome, López and Luna (2021) challenged my findings. They claim that my analysis suffered from various flaws and omitted crucial factors that make US democracy appear more precarious than I suggested.…”

“…Attention to complexity is crucial for understanding the politics of populism. In this spirit, I discuss the major points raised by López and Luna (2021) and scrutinize their counterarguments. This response proceeds largely in the order of their comments.…”