Assessing the Practices and Products of Darkweb Firearm Vendors

Copeland, Christopher; Wallin, Mikaela; Holt, Thomas J.

doi:10.1080/01639625.2019.1596465

Cited by 39 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In an online setting, this social capital (criminal capital in the current context), translates into both the interest generated by (passive) offenders buying a product or service and using it for illicit consumption and also by (active) offenders buying a product or service and receiving support and protection whilst using it to carry out illicit activities. This study resonates with the market analysis and social network approach of those studies which analyse online criminal organisations and cryptomarkets (Leukfeldt et al 2017;Munksgaard et al 2019;Lusthaus 2018;Copeland et al 2020). Our study, however, explores a different type of opportunistic product/servicethe booter or stresser service, which can be hired and used to deliver illegal DDoS attacks.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 58%

More Amazon than Mafia: analysing a DDoS stresser service as organised cybercrime

Musotto

Wall

2020

Trends Organ Crim

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The internet mafia trope has shaped our knowledge about organised crime groups online, yet the evidence is largely speculative and the logic often flawed. This paper adds to current knowledge by exploring the development, operation and demise of an online criminal group as a case study. In this article we analyse a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) stresser (also known as booter) which sells its services online to enable offenders to launch attacks. Using Social Network Analysis to explore the service operations and payment systems, our findings show a central business model that is similar to legitimate e-commerce websites in the way product, price and costumers are differentiated. It also illustrates that its organisation is distributed and not hierarchical and the overall income yield is comparatively low, requiring further organisational activity to make it pay. Finally, we show that the users of the service (mainly offenders) are not only a mixed group of actors, but that it is also possible to discriminate between different levels of seriousness of offending according to the particular service they purchased.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 58%

More Amazon than Mafia: analysing a DDoS stresser service as organised cybercrime

Musotto

Wall

2020

Trends Organ Crim

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“…The challenge of the Tor anonymity network, as intimated by its dual use nature, is that maximal policy solutions all promise to cause harm to some party. Leaving the Tor network up and free from law enforcement investigation is likely to lead to direct and indirect harms that results from the system being used by those engaged in child exploitation ( 7 , 8 ), drug exchange ( 9 – 13 ), and the sale of firearms ( 14 , 15 ), although these harms are of course highly heterogeneous in terms of their potential negative social impacts and some, such as personal drug use, might also have predominantly individual costs in some cases. Conversely, simply working to shut down Tor would cause harm to dissidents and human rights activists, particularly, our results suggest, in more repressive, less politically free regimes where technological protections are often needed the most ( 19 , 20 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They can also use the Tor browser to anonymously read either these Onion/Hidden Services (i.e., sites with rendezvous points located internal to the Tor network) or to access Clear Web sites ( 1 – 5 ). With these diverse supply-side and demand-side functions ( 6 ), many point to the socially harmful uses of Tor as an anonymous platform for child abuse imagery sites ( 7 , 8 ), illicit drug markets ( 9 – 13 ), gun sales ( 14 , 15 ), and potential extremist content that has shifted to the Dark Web after extensive Clear Web content moderation efforts ( 16 ). Others emphasize its socially beneficial potential as a privacy-enhancing tool and censorship circumvention technology ( 17 – 22 ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The potential harms of the Tor anonymity network cluster disproportionately in free countries

Jardine

Lindner

Owenson³

2020

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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The Tor anonymity network allows users to protect their privacy and circumvent censorship restrictions but also shields those distributing child abuse content, selling or buying illicit drugs, or sharing malware online. Using data collected from Tor entry nodes, we provide an estimation of the proportion of Tor network users that likely employ the network in putatively good or bad ways. Overall, on an average country/day, ∼6.7% of Tor network users connect to Onion/Hidden Services that are disproportionately used for illicit purposes. We also show that the likely balance of beneficial and malicious use of Tor is unevenly spread globally and systematically varies based upon a country’s political conditions. In particular, using Freedom House’s coding and terminological classifications, the proportion of often illicit Onion/Hidden Services use is more prevalent (∼7.8%) in “free” countries than in either “partially free” (∼6.7%) or “not free” regimes (∼4.8%).

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“…One precondition for CSAM offenders operating on the darknet is access to the internet and the ability to navigate the clear web in the first place. Rarely do offenders enter the darknet without first navigating the clear web (see Copeland, Wallin & Holt 2020;Martin et al 2020). Once offenders with a certain propensity for CSAM are present on the clear web, they will simply search for CSAM by visiting adult pornographic websites, or searching for keywords via Google, as an example (Westlake 2020).…”

Section: The Crime Set-up Phasementioning

confidence: 99%

Child sexual abuse material on the darknet: a script analysis of how offenders operate

Leclerc¹,

Drew²,

Holt³

et al. 2021

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The development of online technologies in recent decades has facilitated the distribution and consumption of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) over the internet, which also led to the emergence of CSAM on the darknet—the segment of the internet hidden from the general public. Using data obtained from interviews with online investigators, this study uses crime script analysis to reconstruct step-by-step how offenders operate on the darknet. The findings highlight the three phases of the script: (1) the crime set-up phase, (2) the crime completion phase, and (3) the crime continuation phase. Scripting is a practical method of developing concrete ways to address this problem. The implications of using crime scripts to fight CSAM are discussed.

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Assessing the Practices and Products of Darkweb Firearm Vendors

Cited by 39 publications

References 21 publications

More Amazon than Mafia: analysing a DDoS stresser service as organised cybercrime

More Amazon than Mafia: analysing a DDoS stresser service as organised cybercrime

The potential harms of the Tor anonymity network cluster disproportionately in free countries

Child sexual abuse material on the darknet: a script analysis of how offenders operate

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