2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2005.12.004
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Assessing the market power due to the network constraints in competitive electricity markets

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
7
0

Year Published

2010
2010
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
1
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 16 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 11 publications
0
7
0
Order By: Relevance
“…However, the transmission congestion in case H motivates some high-cost GenCos to participate in the market. As shown in Table 4, the NWSR i values of GenCos at buses 1,4,6,12,24,32,34,36,40 and 116 are increased in case H. Due to the limited generation of GenCo at bus 10, NWSR 10 decreases from 0.2121 to 0. In addition, DWI of the market in cases G and H is 0.3311 and 0.2238, respectively.…”
Section: Ieee 118-bus Test Systemmentioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, the transmission congestion in case H motivates some high-cost GenCos to participate in the market. As shown in Table 4, the NWSR i values of GenCos at buses 1,4,6,12,24,32,34,36,40 and 116 are increased in case H. Due to the limited generation of GenCo at bus 10, NWSR 10 decreases from 0.2121 to 0. In addition, DWI of the market in cases G and H is 0.3311 and 0.2238, respectively.…”
Section: Ieee 118-bus Test Systemmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…The concept of must-run generation (MRG) is introduced in [3]; it also proposes nodal must-run share (NMRS) and expected NMRS are proposed to assess the geographical difference of market power and the impact of random failures on nodal market power, respectively. In [4], two sets of indices are proposed: (a) locational privilege (LP) indices that take into account the effect of GenCos positioning in the network on their surplus considering perfect competition model and (b) network market power indices that assess the strategic behaviours of GenCos that may take advantage of transmission congestion. Market inefficiency index, producer surplus deviation index, and consumer surplus deviation index are proposed in [5]t o assess the total surplus distribution between the supply and demand sides in oligopoly and perfectly competitive markets.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[30] Capacity pricing mechanism [31][32][33][34] Ancillary service pricing mechanism [35] Combined clearing of power energy and ancillary service [36] Distributed trading mechanism [37] Market structure design [38] Market power Evaluating metrics [19,[39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46] Evaluating methods [47][48][49][50] Demand response [51][52][53][54] Market efficiency assessment [19] Investment in power systems [55,56] Environmental policy [57][58][59] Pricing mechanisms are the core of market operation design. A lot of practice and research on the applicability and effect of pricing mechanisms has been carried out by the industrial sector and in academia.…”
Section: Regional Marginal Pricing [29] Locational Marginal Pricingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A coevolutionary computation approach was used in Ladjici and Boudour (2008) for finding the nash-cournot equilibrium of the oligopolistic electricity market under transmission constraints. In Bompard et al (2006), the effect of transmission constraints on the Genco's market power was estimated using two different indices. A hierarchical bidding process with congestion management was proposed in a game theoretic framework in Peng and Tomsovic (2003).…”
Section: Evolutionary Neural Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%