Assessing the Impact of Legislative Lobbying Regulations on Interest Group Influence in U.S. State Legislatures

Abstract

All 50 U.S. states currently regulate lobbying. Data restrictions, however, limit our understanding of the relationship between legislative lobbying laws and interest group influence within the legislative process over time. A comparable measure of these laws published in the summer 2005 issue of State Politics and Policy Quarterly suggests a dynamic analysis. The early 1990s witnessed a marked increase in the stringency of state legislative lobbying regulations. This article examines how lobbying regulation impacted interest group influence across all 50 state legislatures in 1995. I then determine whether changes in a state's regulations affected interest group influence over time from 1990 to 1995. Evidence suggests that increased regulation reduces influence both across and within states over time.

Lobbying Regulations and Political Equality in the American States

“…The small set of studies to date that examine the consequences of lobbying regulations in the states have tended to focus on their effects on the size (Hamm, Weber, & Anderson, 1994;Lowery & Gray, 1997) and composition/diversity (Gray & Lowery, 1998;Lowery & Gray, 1993) of a state's interest group community as well as on the passage rate of bills in a state's legislature (Brinig et al, 1993). One notable exception is Ozymy's (2010) analysis of the effect of lobbying regulations on the perceptions of state legislators. Using data on the number of lobbying regulations a state has enacted and a 1995 opinion survey of state legislators, he finds evidence that legislators perceive interest groups exert less influence over legislative outcomes in states with stricter regulations on lobbyists.…”

Comparative lobbying research: advances, shortcomings and recommendations

“…The topics studied by the new school of comparativists, however, are not always new. Ozymy (, ), for example, concentrates on lobbying regulations in the American states from a comparative perspective. However, he brings fresh insights into the topic by suggesting that when stringency of lobbying regulation laws increase, interest group influence decreases (Ozymy, ).…”

“…Ozymy (, ), for example, concentrates on lobbying regulations in the American states from a comparative perspective. However, he brings fresh insights into the topic by suggesting that when stringency of lobbying regulation laws increase, interest group influence decreases (Ozymy, ). He also advances our knowledge about the determinants of stringent lobbying regulations by suggesting that moralistic political culture, as well as political scandals and the weak power of organized interests in state houses positively influence the likelihood of adapting stringent regulations (Ozymy, ).…”

Power to the People: Checking Special Interests in California

“…In addition, while there is some evidence that the perceived power of interest groups decreases with the implementation of reforms (Ozymy 2010), the relationships on which interest group power is based continue.…”

“…The passage of the ethics code and rules of 1966 and the changes made up through the last two decades have clarified what is expected of lobbyists and public officials, and we believe those expectations are generally clear to the public as well. Early research showing that regulation decreases perceived interest group influence on legislative decision making (Ozymy 2010) suggests that regulation matters, and Newmark (2005) ranks California among the seven states with the strictest lobbying regulations (scoring 14 out of 18). California does quite well on its campaign finance disclosure as well, earning an A and ranking number one in the country according to the California Voter Foundation's evaluation.…”