Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations

Abstract

This article treats conflict prevention and conflict transformation as foreign policy tools that are available to international actors alongside classical security-based foreign policy measures. It investigates the conflict resolution role of the EU on the Cyprus conflict in the context of EU accession negotiations. For this purpose, the article: (a) depicts the changes in the roles the EU has played on the island within the context of the accession negotiations; (b) illustrates the nature of structural prevention measures that the EU has taken; and (c) describes the consequences of the EU involvement on UN-led negotiation efforts. The results suggest that the EU has treated the enlargement process as a structural prevention mechanism to change the incentive systems of the conflicting parties -neglecting the conflicttransformation aspects of foreign policymaking. Thus far, this has produced inefficient policies and resulted in the EU bringing an aged conflict into its own jurisdiction. Vision-building, capacity-building, and synergy-building are the three strategies that may help the EU to expand its foreign policy toolbox and to become an influential player in world politics.

An analytical approach on defense expenditure and economic growth

“…The Greek part of the island is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the international arena and continues to act in the name of the entire island. Since 1974, several attempts at mediation by the UN and the USA to achieve a reunified state on the island have failed (Guney, 2004;Fisher, 2001;Eralp and Beriker, 2005). If Greece were to extend its territorial waters from the current six nautical miles to the twelve-mile limit permitted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.…”

Teaching Conflict Resolution: A Model for Student Research in Cyprus

“…By some accounts, the EU has attempted to change the incentives that parties have to sustain or escalate the confl ict, although its success in doing so has been limited (Eralp and Beriker 2005). Th ere have been suggestions that vision building and capacity building are needed to empower the sides to reach a lasting agreement (Eralp and Beriker 2005).…”

A Conceptual Typology of Kin‐State Mediation

“…Turkey played a similar role during the Annan Plan negotiations (2003–2004). When opposed by the hardliner Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, Turkey shifted its support to the Turkish Cypriot opposition and forced Denktash to agree to a referendum to ratify the Annan Plan (Eralp and Beriker ; Ker‐Lindsay ; Palley ). Because the Turkish Cypriots were heavily dependent on Turkey for financial and diplomatic support, Turkish involvement in the Annan Plan negotiations (2002–2004) can be considered as powerbrokering.…”