Assessing pool-based pricing mechanisms in competitive electricity markets

Mendes, D.P.; Kirschen, Daniel

doi:10.1109/pess.2000.866986

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…However, if this cost is used as the market-clearing price, some generating units will never be able to recover their start-up and no-load costs, commonly included in the generation bids. In order to assume that units bid their marginal cost, in our model, the market-clearing price is modified to represent an "adjusted marginal cost" of the marginal unit [19].…”

Section: B Forward Market Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the profitability of flexibility

Jian

Silva

Ochoa

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting

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Abstract--As wind capacity becomes a larger component of the generation portfolio, more flexibility is required to cope with its uncertain and variable nature. In a competitive market environment, the provision and development of this flexibility is driven by the remuneration of flexibility providers. This paper proposes an approach to quantify the profit that market participants derive from providing flexibility services. This is based on the simulation of forward (day-ahead) and real-time balancing markets. In addition, a more flexible market design (rolling commitment) in which a periodic re-optimization is performed to take advantage of updated wind. Test results based on the IEEE RTS-96 are used to compare the profitability of flexibility for different market designs and to assess the effect of the wind forecast error and other parameters on this profitability. The results have shown that with the proposed market design and the associated payment scheme, generators can obtain profit for providing flexibility services as wind penetration increases and the error of the wind forecast and the flexible market design has a significant influence on this profitability.

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Section: B Forward Market Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the profitability of flexibility

Jian

Silva

Ochoa

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting

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“…Under power market environment, the peaking value of generators is sometimes reflected in the electricity prices [1,2]. Northwest China Power System (NCPS) is rich in hydro resources.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peaking cost compensation in Northwest China Power System

Xie¹,

Bai²,

Feng³

et al. 2008

Int Trans Elec Energy Syst

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SUMMARYThe operation scheduling model in Northwest China Power System (NCPS), which is undergoing industry restructuring, is established. The peaking value of generators is identified. Two peaking cost compensation mechanisms for generators are proposed: the first one is based on the theory of cooperative game, the second one based on engineering concept. Some of the characteristics of the suggested game model are analyzed, and several methods for resolving the combinational explosion problem involved in the game-theoretic computation are described. Two numerical indices for quantifying the peaking capability of generators are proposed, the impacts of generator parameters, load variations, and transmission constraints are investigated. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is showed with the simulation results of a 4-generator 8-bus power system and NCPS.

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“…The components of the vector ZT(f, a) (;Tj ( 1f, a),zT2 (f,a),. .,Tm (f' a)) (2) are the Aumann-Shapley prices. For an intuitive interpretation of the A-S prices, assume that the vector a is produced in a homogeneous way, starting from 0 and ending at U Suppose also that along the above production process each time a "small" proportion (an "infinitesimal" one) of a is produced, the mth commodity is charged its current marginal production cost.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

a Study of Reserve Aumann-Shapley Pricing Mechanism in a Competitive Electricity Market

Zhang

2006

2006 International Conference on Power System Technology

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In the traditional vertically integrated electric utility, the generators always provide the reserve without any payment. In the electricity market, it is necessary to encourage the generators to provide the reserve through one scientific and reasonable reserve pricing mechanism. The Reserve AumannShapley Pricing Mechanism is put forward in this paper, with the analysis of the costs and benefits, the mutual costs and benefits of the energy and the reserve are allocated basing on the AumannShapley value firstly, and then the reserve prices under the competitive energy market are formed, the joint optimization model of the energy market considering the reserve AumannShapley price is founded, and the influence of the reserve Aumann-Shapley price on the generators' bidding strategies is analyzed. The Reserve Aumann-Shapley Pricing Mechanism is applicable to the actual model of the electricity market in China, at the same time, the study gives a new idea of the ancillary service pricing in a deregulated electricity market.

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Assessing pool-based pricing mechanisms in competitive electricity markets

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

Evaluating the profitability of flexibility

Evaluating the profitability of flexibility

Peaking cost compensation in Northwest China Power System

a Study of Reserve Aumann-Shapley Pricing Mechanism in a Competitive Electricity Market

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