Assessing landowners’ preferences to inform voluntary private land conservation: The role of non-monetary incentives

Cortés-Capano, Gonzalo; Hanley, Nick; Sheremet, Oleg; Hausmann, Anna; Toivonen, Tuuli; Garibotto-Carton, Gustavo; Soutullo, Álvaro; Minin, Enrico Di

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105626

Cited by 20 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 104 publications

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“…We speculated that a farmer's willingness to engage in the contract would also depend on a number of perceived benefits and costs to the farmer of enrolling, determined by the contract design. These consist of (a) MONITOR, referring to who is in charge of monitoring bird populations on farms and reporting this information to the regulator; this is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the participating farmer performs these tasks and 0 if an external expert performs them; (b) TA is the availability of technical assistance and advice provided to enrolling farmers on land management practices which are viewed as being effective for achieving the ecological outcomes determining payment; this is also a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if assistance is available and 0 otherwise (see, for example, Cortés‐Capano et al, 2021), and (c) CERTI is the availability of eco‐certification for outcome‐achieved farming products; it takes a value of 1 if eco‐certification is available and 0 otherwise. In this hypothetical certification scheme, only participating farmers who achieve the outcome can use the eco‐label, which allows them to earn a price premium on their crops.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farmers’ preferences toward an outcome‐based payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan

Tanaka

Hanley

Kühfuss

2022

J Agricultural Economics

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We estimate farmers’ preferences for outcome‐based (or results‐based) payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan. To this end, we use a two‐stage stated preference approach—the first stage models farmers’ decisions to adopt outcome‐based contracts using a discrete choice experiment. The second stage estimates the areas of land which farmers who choose to participate will enrol in the scheme. Based on a sample of 333 respondents, our results show that most farmers are willing to participate in outcome‐based contacts. A variety of contract attributes are found to influence farmers’ decisions on participation. However, once a farmer decides to participate, their decision on how much farmland to enrol in is likely to be influenced solely by the per‐hectare payment. Therefore, to encourage more farmers to participate and enrol more farmland, policy‐makers’ decisions on the level of payments offered are critically important.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farmers’ preferences toward an outcome‐based payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan

Tanaka

Hanley

Kühfuss

2022

J Agricultural Economics

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“…Several studies have noted that local people are not sufficiently involved in conservation planning [33,98,143,144,151], and their interests are disregarded in other national parks in Europe [128,144,151]. The need to compensate for disadvantages due to restrictions has also been highlighted in recent studies in Uruguay, India, Poland, Lithuania, China, and Vietnam [104,109,111,153,[160][161][162]. Compensation mechanisms can be both monetary and non-monetary; both have been criticized and praised [147,160,161].…”

Section: Preferred Compensation Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The need to compensate for disadvantages due to restrictions has also been highlighted in recent studies in Uruguay, India, Poland, Lithuania, China, and Vietnam [104,109,111,153,[160][161][162]. Compensation mechanisms can be both monetary and non-monetary; both have been criticized and praised [147,160,161]. Similar to the results of the current study, the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process and receive fair treatment has also been a priority for local people in other national parks, such as in Slovenia and Poland [144,153].…”

Section: Preferred Compensation Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socio-Economic Effects of National Park Governance and Management: Lessons from Post-Socialist Era Estonia

Järv

Ward

Raet

et al. 2021

Land

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Despite the significant increase in protected territory globally, there is a common understanding that the designation of protected areas alone does not guarantee their effectiveness nor halt the loss of biodiversity. In addition to biodiversity conservation, protected areas are expected to perform a number of other functions, such as provide ecosystem services and improve local socio-economic conditions. Therefore, the need to strive towards mixed, decentralized conservation management and stakeholder involvement is increasingly emphasized. Although there is limited research, it has been noted that protected areas have not served wider objectives effectively enough. The current study provides insight concerning socio-economic effects of different governance and management practices of protected areas based on perceptions of residents and stakeholders of five national parks of Estonia. It was found that conservation status has an important impact on local socio-economic conditions largely depending on governance and management practices, resulting in both, positive and negative effects. It was concluded that the centralization of nature conservation and the abolition of protected area administrations have led to a gradual distancing of nature conservation from local conditions and the population, causing concern about the preservation of the living environment.

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“…Financial incentives may encourage enrollment by compensating landowners for stewardship costs or the opportunity costs of alternative land uses foregone (Lute et al, 2018; Selinske et al, 2017). However, monetary benefits are unlikely to attract landowners who are economically dependent on their properties or who have already transformed their properties to intensive uses (Cortés‐Capano et al, 2021). Moreover, PES payments may be insufficient to meet local subsistence needs, thereby failing to address issues of social justice (Alves‐Pinto et al, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Financial incentives may crowd out existing stewardship motivations by teaching landowners to expect payment for conservation actions (Cortés‐Capano et al, 2021; Selinske et al, 2017). Thus, PES programs are more likely to be effective if they enhance non‐financial motivations for stewardship.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivations for, and barriers to, landowner participation in Argentina's payments for ecosystem services program

Godoy

Pienaar

2023

Conservat Sci and Prac

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Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs are a common policy tool to conserve forests. Effective PES programs attain conservation and social equity outcomes by actively engaging diverse landowners in long-term land stewardship and meeting landowners' needs. In 2017-2018, we conducted 32 in-depth interviews with landowners, technicians, and government officials to attain insights into how the PES program in Salta province, Argentina, has performed in terms of (1) motivating landowners to enroll in PES, and (2) ensuring their satisfaction with the design and performance of the program, a necessary precondition to ensure long-term forest stewardship. Interviewees suggested that landowners enroll in PES because they are restricted from engaging in more profitable land uses, they are not reliant on income from their land, they need PES payments to cover their land management costs, they are unable or unwilling to sell their land because their property values have been adversely impacted by land-use restrictions, they want to sustainably manage forested land, and/or they want to protect their property rights. Interviewees stated that land title requirements, conflicts over user rights, and high transaction costs hinder PES enrollment and exacerbate social conflicts between landowners and indigenous communities. Finally, interviewees questioned the conservation effectiveness of the PES program, owing to the program design and inadequate funding. Our findings suggest that engaging technicians, landowners, and indigenous communities in discussions on how the structure of the PES program could be improved might allow for shared learning, improved institutional trust, and the design of more flexible contracts that would facilitate sustained conservation and improved social equity.

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Assessing landowners’ preferences to inform voluntary private land conservation: The role of non-monetary incentives

Cited by 20 publications

References 104 publications

Farmers’ preferences toward an outcome‐based payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan

Farmers’ preferences toward an outcome‐based payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan

Socio-Economic Effects of National Park Governance and Management: Lessons from Post-Socialist Era Estonia

Motivations for, and barriers to, landowner participation in Argentina's payments for ecosystem services program

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