Assessing Freedom of Information in Latin America a Decade Later: Illuminating a Transparency Causal Mechanism

Michener, Gregory

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3290817

Cited by 4 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…In studying the spread of these laws, scholars often focus on their increasing salience as a global norm (Florini 2007), the roles of government and media structure (Michener 2011a(Michener , 2011b(Michener , 2015a(Michener , 2015b, and international organizations (Grigorescu 2003). Berliner (2014) focuses on the role of political competition in explaining the timing of passage across countries, also identifying an important effect of international diffusion.…”

Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Berliner (2014) focuses on the role of political competition in explaining the timing of passage across countries, also identifying an important effect of international diffusion. However, the frequent shortcomings of implementation and compliance after passage are also well known (Darch and Underwood 2010;Hazell 1989;Michener 2011aMichener , 2011b; Open Society Justice Initiative [OSJI] 2006;Roberts 2006). Research on national-level compliance has emphasized a multitude of factors, often in combination with each other.…”

Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the frequent shortcomings of implementation and compliance after passage are also well known (Darch and Underwood 2010;Hazell 1989;Michener 2011aMichener , 2011b; Open Society Justice Initiative [OSJI] 2006;Roberts 2006). These include legal design (Berliner 2016), internal procedures and records management (Dokeniya 2013;Neuman and Calland 2007;Piotrowski et al 2009), oversight bodies (Holsen and Pasquier 2012), public demand (Calland and Bentley 2013), weak state capacity (Roberts 2010;Szekely 2007), limited political will (Gill and Hughes 2005;Hazell and Worthy 2010), and the balance of power between executive and legislative branches (Michener 2015a(Michener , 2015b. These include legal design (Berliner 2016), internal procedures and records management (Dokeniya 2013;Neuman and Calland 2007;Piotrowski et al 2009), oversight bodies (Holsen and Pasquier 2012), public demand (Calland and Bentley 2013), weak state capacity (Roberts 2010;Szekely 2007), limited political will (Gill and Hughes 2005;Hazell and Worthy 2010), and the balance of power between executive and legislative branches (Michener 2015a(Michener , 2015b.…”

Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Boix and Svolik (2013), for example, detail the importance of information-sharing mechanisms in electoral authoritarian regimes, while Martin and Vanberg (2004) and Michener (2015aMichener ( , 2015b note the importance of monitoring in multiparty coalition governments. Where multiple parties have representation, implementing transparency reforms can help actors make more credible bargains with each other, knowing that formal avenues of information sharing exist.…”

Section: The Role Of Political Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On one hand, some scholars have argued that divided governments or coalition governments lead to greater transparency, as transparency mechanisms allow coalition members or parties sharing power to better monitor each other's actions (Alt, Lassen, and Rose 2006;Michener 2015aMichener , 2015b. There is no centralized source of data on the precise nature of these coalitions, which are often between different sets of parties in different municipalities (in some cases between the ANC and the DA or IFP, and in other cases between one of the major parties and any number of smaller parties), and often frequently shifting.…”

Section: Local Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Berliner

2016

Governance

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Institutional reforms often face challenges of poor compliance and implementation at the local level. I analyze these in a context where weak state capacity and limited enforcement make widespread compliance unlikely. South Africa's 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act tasked the South African Human Rights Commission with monitoring and promoting compliance, but with limited resources and no authority to sanction. I argue that local political competition can generate endogenous incentives for compliance, even under conditions of weak capacity and limited external enforcement. Using data on 234 South African municipalities over 10 years, I find higher levels of compliance among more politically competitive municipalities. The results are not simply a function of differences between African National Congress–governed municipalities and others, and are robust to numerous controls for different forms of local state capacity.

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Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Access To Information and Local Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Role Of Political Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Local Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Berliner

2016

Governance

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Comparing Resistance to Open Data Performance Measurement: Public Education in Brazil and the Uk

Michener

Ritter

2016

Public Administration

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Much is known about governmental resistance to disclosure laws, less so about multi‐stakeholder resistance to open data. This study compares open data initiatives within the primary and secondary school systems of Brazil and the UK, focusing on stakeholder resistance and corresponding policy solutions. The analytical framework is based on the ‘Three‐Ps’ of open data resistance to performance metrics, corresponding to professional, political, and privacy‐related concerns. Evidence shows that resistance is highly nuanced, as stakeholders alternately serve as both principals and agents. School administrators, for example, are simultaneously principals to service providers and teachers, and at once agents to parents and politicians. Relying on a different systems comparison, in‐depth interviews, and newspaper content analyses, we find that similar stakeholders across countries demonstrate strikingly divergent levels of resistance. In overcoming stakeholder resistance – across socioeconomic divides – context conscientious ‘data‐informed’ evaluations may promote greater acceptance than narrowly ‘data‐driven’ performance measurements.

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Dynamic transparency: An audit of Mexico's Freedom of Information Act

Lagunes

Pocasangre

2018

Public Administration

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Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) aim to provide a channelled exchange between citizens and public officials that, irrespective of the citizen's identity, results in the provision of timely, relevant, and often new information about policy. We evaluated Mexico's FOIA by submitting 307 information requests on behalf of an average male citizen to government entities in the years 2007, 2013, and 2015. In 2007, we also submitted the same requests to 87 comparable entities on behalf of a male citizen who signalled economic and political clout. Encouragingly, entities do not discriminate between regular and seemingly influential citizens. Entities also answer more frequently and provide more information in 2015 compared to earlier years, but they are taking longer to answer, frequently charging fees, and often failing to provide quality information to questions they are legally bound to answer. Mexico's FOIA is a functional system demanding significant improvements.

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Assessing Freedom of Information in Latin America a Decade Later: Illuminating a Transparency Causal Mechanism

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Comparing Resistance to Open Data Performance Measurement: Public Education in Brazil and the Uk

Dynamic transparency: An audit of Mexico's Freedom of Information Act

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