Assessing Concept Possession as an Explicit and Social Practice

Abstract

We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple‐choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandom's inferentialism—the view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple‐choice tests at schools might fail to accurately assess the possession of a concept or the lack of it, for they only check the written outputs of the pupils who take them, without detecting the inferences actually endorsed or used by them. We suggest that school tests would acquire reliability if they enabled pupils to make the reasons of their answers or the inferences they use explicit, so as to contribute to what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. We explore the possibility of putting this suggestion into practice by deploying two‐tier multiple‐choice tests.

A Problem for Cognitive Load Theory—the Distinctively Human Life‐form

“…These include Causton (2019), McCrory (2015), Taylor et al . (2017) and Marabini and Moretti (2017). 25 This richer picture is lost in the way that cognitive load theory is currently being interpreted as applying to classroom practice 26…”

“…Several authors have attempted to address the pedagogical implications of a richer picture of knowledge and learning by approaching educational practice from an inferentialist perspective. These include Causton (2019), McCrory (2015), Taylor et al (2017) and Marabini and Moretti (2017). 25 This richer picture is lost in the way that cognitive load theory is currently being interpreted as applying to classroom practice.…”