Assessing Chinese governance low-carbon economic peer effects in local government and under sustainable environmental regulation

Abstract

The current study developed a systematic analytical framework to explore the logic of forming the cohort effect of green governance and green development in China in the new era. Based on provincial panel data from 2008 to 2018, this paper examines the existence, scope, and induced control of the green governance peer effects using a spatial econometric approach. The study found that the following: (1) Influenced by the top-level design of the central government and the contradictory governance of regional development, the local governments form the peer effects in green governance activities. The existence of spatial relationships makes local governments dependent on a solid financial support system and a basis for industrial transformation, thus counteracting regional competition for green governance. (2) The green governance peer effects tend to decay with increasing geographical distance but do not disappear across regional boundaries under either spatial interaction framework. (3) Considering the impact of green governance policy systems and regional heterogeneity, the green governance peer effects decrease in the eastern, western, and central regions in that order. (4) Further, the influencing factors show that the green governance peer effects arise from intra-local government competition under the decentralization of power between the central and local governments. The competition for scales and the relative performance appraisal system reinforces the peer motivation of each subject. (5) The strong correlation of green governance willingness indicates that local governments cannot escape from will-led emotional behavior, and personal interests and governance motivation further drive the formation of pseudo-rational decisions, ultimately leading to irrational group decisions.

How Multi-Dimensional Local Government Competition Impacts Green Economic Growth? A Case Study of 272 Chinese Cities

“…Moreover, the Chinese government further advances marketoriented reforms after 2012, which highlight "a greater and broader role of the market in resource allocation," thus the status of the market in resource allocation is enhanced and the economic competition from local governments is relatively reduced, resulting in a relatively lower impact of economic competition on negative green economic growth (Tang and Qin, 2022). Judging from the perspective of ecological competition and service competition, environmental regulation strengthens after 2012, investment in environmental pollution control rises year by year, which contradicts the increase in environmental infrastructure and contributes to the increase in the number of environmental practitioners (Liu et al, 2022). Moreover, local governments' ecological competition intensified in line with the yearly reinforcement of their environmental governance capacity and guided by the eco-performance assessment.…”

“…Capital attraction competition is a more used variable in local government competition studies, which portrays the strength and ability of local governments in attracting capital through FDI (Fan and Zhou, 2019). Fiscal competition, as the most directly controlled competitive tool for local governments, captures the economic spending propensity of local governments through the ratio of fiscal expenditure to fiscal revenue (Jiang et al, 2022;Liu et al, 2022).…”

Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies

“…Since farmers and local governments are rational people [56][57][58], they will choose the strategy that is beneficial to each of them, and this determines that both sides of the game will put their individual interests at stake when making decisions, ignoring the real purpose of using organic fertilizers to improve the environment, and weakening the efforts to improve carbon sequestration capacity and reduce the efficiency of meeting carbon sequestration targets. This is reflected in the inefficient implementation of applying organic fertilizers by farmers, who seek subsidies and other social resources to participate in organic fertilizer application activities and may shirk their responsibilities in the process of organic fertilizer application.…”

Assessing the impact of governance and health expenditures on carbon emissions in China: Role of environmental regulation

“…This framework was first proposed by Kuznets ( 73 ). By reading the work of ( 15 , 78 ) and adding urbanization, health expenditures, governance, and the rule of law to the KEC model, we can make the model more comprehensive. The following outlines our extended ENVIRONMENT KUZNETS CURVE model:…”