Assertion and Assessment Sensitivity

Abstract

Gareth Evans (1985) and Sven Rosenkranz (2008) have respectively formulated two objections to truth relativism that would show that this view does not cohere with our practice of asserting. I argue that the relativist should answer such objections by appealing to the notion of assessment sensitivity. Since the relativist accounts for this notion by means of a technical truth predicate relating propositions to contexts of assessment, the task left to her turns out to be to make sense of assessment sensitivity by making sense of this predicate (i.e. by showing that it expresses a truth notion). (2008) formularam, respectivamente, duas objeções ao relativismo da verdade que mostrariam que esta visão não é coerente com nossa prática de afirmar. Defendo que o relativista deve responder a tais objeções apelando à noção de sensibilidade da avaliação. Tendo em mente que o relativista considera essa noção por meio de um predicado de verdade técnica, a tarefa deixada para ele calha de ser dar * RESUMO Gareth Evans (1985) e Sven Rosenkranz

Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth

“…Of course, there are interesting (and difficult) issues regarding the relativistic notions of immediate pragmatic relevance: once speech acts such as assertion are understood in terms of these notions, it is not clear whether we may still think of them as aiming to, or as being (constitutively) normed by, truth or correctness (Evans (1985), MacFarlane (2005), García-Carpintero (2008), Field (2009)), so that it is not clear whether we can still make sense of assertion as a norm-governed practice (Caso (2014), Greenough (2011), MacFarlane ( 2014)) or we have to make sense of assertion under a different way of conceptualizing it-e.g., in terms of commitments rather than aims (MacFarlane ( 2005)). More recently, Gariazzo (2016Gariazzo ( , 2019 has claimed that assessment-sensitivity can be made sense of only piecemeal, taking one area of discourse at a time, and that usual ways of doing so are not successful. However, even if thorny, these issues are orthogonal to the issue of the compatibility of truth relativism with the claim that our ordinary truth predicate obeys one (suitably restricted) version of (EQ) or other.…”

Truth and directness in pictorial assertion

“…See e.g.MacFarlane (2014, 126-127), for a brief discussion of what he calls "accuracy" of speech acts. Also seeGariazzo (2019) for relevant discussion.…”