2016
DOI: 10.3765/salt.v26i0.3782
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Assertability conditions of epistemic (and fictional) attitudes and mood variation

Abstract: Italian is a well-known exception to the cross-linguistic generalization according to which belief predicates are indicative selectors across languages. We newly propose that languages that select the subjunctive with non-factive epistemic predicates allow us to see a systematic polysemy between what we call an expressive-'belief' (featuring only a doxastic dimension) and an inquisitive-'belief' (featuring both a doxastic and an epistemic dimension conveying doxastic certainty (in the assertion) and epistemic … Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(32 citation statements)
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References 11 publications
(20 reference statements)
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“…This may be adequate for textbook purposes, but the truth judgement often appears to be more complex, and it is done not in isolation but relative to the speaker and hearer, who assess whether a sentence is true or not given what they know or what they believe (Giannakidou 1994(Giannakidou , 1998(Giannakidou , 1999(Giannakidou , 2009Harris and Potts 2009;de Marneffe et al 2012). That such relativization is needed becomes particularly visible when we discuss propositional attitude verbs (know, believe, imagine, etc) and their complements (Farkas 1992, Giannakidou 1994, Mari 2016; but the role of the individual in assessing truth is apparent even in unembedded sentences, as expressed also very lucidly in Harris and Potts (2009) recent assertion that all sentences are perspectival.…”
Section: Subjective (Non)veridicality: Relative and Objective Truthmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…This may be adequate for textbook purposes, but the truth judgement often appears to be more complex, and it is done not in isolation but relative to the speaker and hearer, who assess whether a sentence is true or not given what they know or what they believe (Giannakidou 1994(Giannakidou , 1998(Giannakidou , 1999(Giannakidou , 2009Harris and Potts 2009;de Marneffe et al 2012). That such relativization is needed becomes particularly visible when we discuss propositional attitude verbs (know, believe, imagine, etc) and their complements (Farkas 1992, Giannakidou 1994, Mari 2016; but the role of the individual in assessing truth is apparent even in unembedded sentences, as expressed also very lucidly in Harris and Potts (2009) recent assertion that all sentences are perspectival.…”
Section: Subjective (Non)veridicality: Relative and Objective Truthmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Suppositional belief licenses the subjunctive mood, as can be seen clearly in Italian Mari (2016). refers to suppositional belief as conjectural belief.…”
mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Unexpectedly, fictional predicates can also license the subjunctive in Italian (see Mari, 2016;Giannaidou and Mari, in press, Mari and Portner, 2019).…”
Section: Private and Public Fictional Predicatesmentioning
confidence: 99%