Assembly Problems

Gupta, Dhritiman; Sarkar, Soumendu

doi:10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_5

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Reciprocal gradualism, as analyzed by [5], implies a positive relationship between γL(tL) and γL(tL − 1), and likewise between γH(tH) and γH(tH − 1). For example, if the Buyer and the low-value Seller in an experimental game followed reciprocal gradualism, then the more concession a Buyer made toward the low-value Seller in interaction t L− 1, the more the concession the low-value Seller would reciprocate toward the Buyer in interaction tL.…”

Section: Evidence Of Reciprocal Gradualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study

Mak,

Zwick

2024

Games

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We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures complementary items from two heterogeneous sellers with endogenous choice of the order of bargaining. In addition, we implemented an information transparency manipulation regarding whether the sellers were informed about each other’s offers/counteroffers with the buyer. Experimental behavior exhibited deviations from equilibrium predictions that did not differ significantly by information condition, suggesting that sellers were not significantly influenced by direct social comparison between each other. Further analysis suggests that each seller demanded splitting the value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark.

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Section: Evidence Of Reciprocal Gradualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, fairness concern in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity could be more complex than in twoparty bargaining. Consider, for example, a setting in which a buyer needs to close price deals with most or all of multiple sellers each holding a complementary item [5]. There could be two different types of fairness concerns.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study

Mak,

Zwick

2024

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Assembly Problems

Cited by 1 publication

References 24 publications

Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study

Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study

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