Aspirational theism and gratuitous suffering

Abstract

Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism. In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering (i.e. God would not permit gratuitous suffering). On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – and even then, there are reasons to worry that they are inferior to the theistic alternative. Given this difference, we have a strong pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, reason to adopt aspirational theism.

Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils

“…Similar versions of this argument can be found in Jackson (2021) and Jackson (ms.). 18 There are related pragmatic arguments from the Axiology of Theism (e.g., Penner and Arbour (2017), Lougheed (2019), Lougheed (2020), Lougheed (2022), Licon (2021)). Some of these arguments may be related to (and may be reformulated as) pragmatic arguments from horrendous evils.…”

“…18 18 There are related pragmatic arguments from the Axiology of Theism (e.g., Penner and Arbour (2017), Lougheed (2019), Lougheed (2020), Lougheed (2022), Licon (2021)).Some of these arguments may be related to (and may be reformulated as) pragmatic arguments from horrendous evils. A related strategy some philosophers of religion take is to demonstrate that the narrative/worldview of theism is preferable or is more effective in reaching some pragmatic end than non‐theism, with pragmatic ends broad enough to include: which narrative is preferable, or helps us cope better, or helps us make sense of horrendous evils better etc.…”