Aspects of Compulsory Intervention in Australia and Israel

Abstract

The high and rapidly rising rate of work stoppages has created cortcern in many industrialised countries. The increase in industrial unrest has been accompanied by a growing public demand for greater intervention by govern ment in labour management relations. The desirability of such compulsory intervention is, however, a subject of great controversy. Israel and Australia provide a useful comparative study for the various effects of compulsory inter ventian in labour relations. The objective of this article is to compare the process, effects and effectiveness of compulsory intervention in the two countries. The conclusion is that it has not been proven that compulsory arbitration will result in a lower level of strike activity, while its introduction may result in irreversible and sometimes undesirable effects on the conduct of industrial relations.

Winners and Losers

“…Thus, contributing factors have included: the demographic character as well as the past decision record of the arbitrator (Scott and Shadoan 1989;Dvorkin 1974;Heneman and Saunder 1982;Thornton and Zirkel 1990); the type of representative presenting a case (Thornicroft 1994;Block and Stieber 1987;McKelvey 1984); the size (strength) and character of the group initiating a case (Summers 1984;McCarthy 1968); the advantages to be gained from entering arbitration (Bruce 1992); the general climate for arbitration (Crow and Logan 1995); and even the types of tactics or strategy employed (Overton 1973). Other studies have focused on the arbitration process (Fleming 1984), the importance of precedents (Olson and Jarley 1991;Prasow 1974), the homogeneity of the plaintiffs (Galin 1980) and even the impact of arbitrator choice (Bemmels 1990;Coulson 1967). All of these factors have been put forward as critical variables in bringing about a decision favouring the plaintiff or respondent.…”