Articulating ideology: How liberals and conservatives justify political affiliations using morality-based explanations

Rempala, Daniel M.; Okdie, Bradley M.; Garvey, Kilian

doi:10.1007/s11031-016-9563-9

Cited by 19 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Prior research (Deppe et al, ) reveals that lower CRT levels are associated with higher conservatism, and that lower CRT scores are associated with higher cognitive biases (i.e., Baldi et al, ; Noori, ; but see Kahan, ). In addition, Republicans and conservatives show greater ingroup loyalty than Democrats and liberals (e.g., Rempala et al, ; Weber & Federico, ). In Studies 2 and 3, we examined whether these variables explained the patterns of ingroup favoritism, but we found no evidence of mediation for either variable on electability outcomes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moral foundations theory suggests that ingroup loyalty is one factor that should be endorsed more strongly by conservatives than liberals (Haidt & Graham, ). Supporting this claim, literature suggests that Republicans show greater ingroup loyalty than Democrats (e.g., Rempala, Okdie, & Garvey, ); likewise, conservatives show greater ingroup loyalty than liberals (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, ; Weber & Federico, ). Furthermore, ingroup loyalty is associated with higher endorsement of conservative moral values, conservative issues, and conservative policies, such as restrictions on stem cell research and supporting foreign policy that endorses militant internationalism (e.g., Clifford & Jerit, ; Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, & Iyer, ; Precopio & Ramsey, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Individuating information influences partisan judgments

Price‐Blackshear

Sheldon

Corcoran

et al. 2019

J Applied Social Pyschol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Three studies examined whether Democrats and Republicans expressed favoritism toward an ingroup political candidate, even when the candidates were presented as positive and bipartisan. Participants rated electability and traits, after reading party consistent (Passage 1) and positive, bipartisan information (Passage 2). Conservatism (Studies 1-3), the cognitive reflection test (Studies 2-3), and ingroup loyalty (Study 3) were examined. Republicans showed initially higher favoritism after the first passage. Both Republicans and Democrats showed lower ingroup favoritism after reading the second passage, although Republicans continued to show more favoritism than Democrats in some circumstances. Conservatism was associated with greater favorability toward the Republican candidate. Our results showed no evidence that CRT or ingroup loyalty mediated these associations. | 427PRICE-BLACKSHEAR Et AL. strongly subscribed to the ideology of their group, we expect that they will be more likely to indicate their ingroup candidate is more electable than their outgroup candidate and rate the their ingroup candidate's traits as more positive than the outgroup candidate, when candidates are described as party consistent. Importantly, as we explain in the following subsections, we subsequently described the same political candidates with information that was party neutral and positive to examine which mechanisms may reduce ingroup favoritism.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Individuating information influences partisan judgments

Price‐Blackshear

Sheldon

Corcoran

et al. 2019

J Applied Social Pyschol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Indeed, this two (or perhaps three) higher-order factor view of morality appears to be a better fit to MFQ data than the straightforward five or six factor view advanced in the original moral foundations theory (see Davies, Sibley, & Liu, 2014;Harper, 2020;Weber & Federico, 2013). As such, it may be that the standard distinction between liberals and conservatives possessing two-and five-channel versions of morality (Graham et al, 2009;Johnson et al, 2017;Kugler et al, 2014;Rempala et al, 2016) is incorrect, and that the two groups differ on the degree to which they endorse these two (or perhaps three, when including liberty; see Harper, 2020;Iyer et al, 2012) domains of moral intuition.…”

Section: Moral Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Foremost of these concerns is the internal consistency of some of the subscales (operationalized as Cronbach's alpha coefficients; see Tamul et al, 2020), with poor reliability estimates being reported for each of the care/harm (α = .50-.62; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;Harper & Hogue, 2019), fairness/reciprocity (α = .39-.69;Graham et al, 2009;2011;Harper & Hogue, 2019), ingroup/loyalty (α = .24-.58;Graham et al, 2009;, authority/respect (α = .39-.64; Graham et al, 2009), and purity/sanctity (α = .58; Graham et al, 2009) In spite of the psychometrically questionable underpinnings of the MFQ, consistent ideological differences have been reported between self-identified liberals and conservatives (for a popular review, see Haidt, 2012). Cross-culturally, liberals are said to endorse a 'twochannel' view of morality, focusing predominantly on themes of care and fairness, whereas conservatives value all five of the original moral domains approximately equally (Graham et al, 2009;Johnson et al, 2017;Kugler et al, 2014;Rempala, Okdie, & Garvey, 2016).…”

Section: Moral Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological measurement in social and political psychology

Ca¹

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As the domains of social and personality psychological science undergo marked changes in their approach to research (e.g., open science practices, and addressing the replication crisis), it is important to undertake a full review of the tools and measures that we have at our disposal.In addition, the growing sense of political and ideological polarization in contemporary western democracies necessitates a coherent and internally consistent approach to studying politically and ideologically sensitive topics. This paper explores the measurement and study of such topics, and posits that claims about (a)symmetries between ideological partisans may be rooted in different measurement approaches. A more consistent and ecologically valid approach to studying partisan engagement with political topics is advocated, focusing on situational responses to ideologically salient scenarios, rather than placing our focus on results from decontextualized self-report individual difference measures. Suggestions for broader debiasing research reforms are also explored. Ideological measurement in social and political psychologyThe landscape of social psychology is currently undergoing some stark changes.Emerging practices to address the 'replication crisis' (Brandt et al., 2014;Lindsay, 2015) and the advent of increasingly open research practices, such as data-and materials-sharing, protocol and analytic pre-registration, and the peer-review of research plans before data are collected and results are known (Chambers, 2018;van't Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; have led the field to consider some of the questionable research practices that have historically persisted in some spheres .Although these movements are clearly positive for the state of our science, they focus only on the higher-level processes associated with potential biases in research design and execution. This paper begins by looking at the 'nuts and bolts' of social and personality psychological research, as applied in the political domain, to explore potential sources of ideological bias in the conceptualization and interpretation of ideologies. That is, there is an argument to be made that our current approaches to studying similarities and differences between those from competing political or ideological persuasions (from here, these similarities and differences are referred to as 'political/ideological (a)symmetries') may contain epistemic biases on the part of the field in the aggregate. In doing so, a critique of commonly used measurement tools in the political psychology domain is offered, and further suggestions for alternative approaches to researching ideological (a)symmetries are offered that are consistent with the continuing the recent advances in social psychological research.

show abstract

“…Here, multiple research teams have consistently reported differences in the endorsement of the moral foundations between ideological and partisan groups from across the political spectrum (for a popular review, see Haidt, 2012). Across cultures, liberals are said to endorse a 'two-channel' view of morality, with the focus in these individuals being on caring for the most vulnerable in society and acting fairly or equitably, whereas conservatives value all five of the original moral foundations at around the same level (see Graham et al, 2009;2012;Johnson et al, 2017;Kugler et al, 2014;Rempala et al, 2016). These high-level ideological differences are also observable in self-reported voting preferences, with the leftward voting being prediction by higher levels of endorsement of 'individualizing' (care and fairness) foundations, and rightward voting by endorsement of 'binding' (authority, loyalty, and purity) foundations (Franks & Scherr, 2015;Milesi, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reanalyzing the factor structure of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Harper¹,

Rhodes²

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The moral foundations theory (MFT) is an influential multifactorial model that posits how decision-making in the moral context originates from a set of six intuitive moral foundations: care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, and liberty. The established measure of these foundations – the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) – has been used extensively in a range of empirical projects. However, recent analyses of its factor structure and the internal consistency of the each of the foundation clusters have called its validity into question. In this paper, data from a large sample of British voters (N = 428) was used to re-examine the component structure of the MFQ. As opposed to a six-component structure, only three meaningful clusters emerged: traditionalism, compassion, and liberty. Concurrent validity was established via correlations with measures of ‘social change’ and ‘systemic inequality’ insecurities, while significant differences on each of the three components of the revised MFQ (MFQ-r) were observed between the voters of different political parties. Implications for moral foundations theory and its measurement are discussed.

show abstract

Articulating ideology: How liberals and conservatives justify political affiliations using morality-based explanations

Cited by 19 publications

References 39 publications

Individuating information influences partisan judgments

Individuating information influences partisan judgments

Ideological measurement in social and political psychology

Reanalyzing the factor structure of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About