How do small states navigate the current geostrategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China? If one solely takes the view of realpolitik or power politics, there seems to be very few options for weaker states. The history of international relations showed us that they played derivative roles as proxies for great powers, sites or theaters of conflict, and worst, possible victims of collateral damage in superpower clashes. A known African proverb resembles small states as the grass that gets trampled by elephants (superpowers) regardless whether they fight (conflict) or make love (cooperation). And in times of deep and pernicious polarization between great powers, the precarity of small states are heightened to unprecedented degrees.Nonetheless, attempts to mitigate the negative repercussions stemming from the Sino-US geostrategic rivalry from the collective of small states have not gathered sufficient success thus far. On the contrary, there is increasing pressure for states to choose a side despite the benefits of taking an ambiguous stance given superpower competition. In a recent keynote speech in the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. admitted that superpower rivalry has constrained the choices of small powers and has exacerbated regional flashpoints. He warned that small states could be included in new geopolitical spheres of influence and become buffer states. Instead, small and middle powers have the agency to forge consensus, build bridges, and even shape the rules. Instead of paws, another perspective offers that small states can be credible pathfinder, trusted partners, and committed peacemakers. To fulfill these potentials, there is a need for small states to assert their agency but to also collectively organize and band together.Previous articles published in Asian Politics & Policy emphasized the moments where the agency of small states can be seen. For example, the hedging strategy between competing regional powers has been the default approach of small Arab Gulf states to address their respective security dilemmas (Hamdi & Salman, 2020). Using Malaysia as a case study, Kuik (2016) also argued that hedging is the strategy of smaller powers, especially those that hedge on a wide variety of security risks, rather than focused on any major power. Using other countries in Southeast Asia like Cambodia and Vietnam, Železný (2022) revealed the diverse types of hedging behavior given US-China competition during the Obama administration. These research articles suggest the states can creatively navigate the competition between great powers. It remains to be seen whether these strategies are sustainable as the rivalry between US and China intensifies.In this issue of APP, we also feature similar studies that reflect on the ability of Asian states to manoeuvre around superpower rivalry. The articles written by Ibarra (2024) and Syailendra (2024) analyze the attempt of small states like the Philippines and Malaysia in dealing with China as regards the contentious issu...
