Arms versus Democratic Allies

Abstract

In theory, states can gain security by acquiring internal arms or external allies. Yet the empirical literature offers mixed findings: some studies find arms and allies to be substitutes, while others find them to be complements. This article contends that these conflicting findings are due to scholars failing to consider how regime type influences the choice between arms and allies. Since democracies are highly credible allies, states that form alliances with democracies can confidently reduce their internal arms. This is not the case when states form alliances with non-democracies. This study evaluates the argument using data on military expenditures and defense pacts from 1950 to 2001. Taking steps to account for the potentially endogenous relationship between arms and allies, it finds that democratic alliances are associated with lower levels of military spending.

When Do Leaders Free‐Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense

“…There are good reasons to question an ally's reliability: Studies show that alliance commitments are violated in war between 25% and 50% of the time (Berkemeier and Fuhrmann ; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell ). To the extent that a NATO ally doubts the dependability of the U.S. security guarantee, free‐riding may be a risky strategy (see Digiuseppe and Poast ; Goldstein ). By contrast, leaders who have confidence in American commitments may be more comfortable free‐riding.…”

“…I develop a behavioral theory of free‐riding. Most research on social dilemmas in international relations emphasizes structural factors such as group size (Axelrod and Keohane ), national wealth (Olson and Zeckhauser ), or regime type (Digiuseppe and Poast ). My focus, by contrast, is on individual leaders.…”

Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances

“…If alliances do provide public goods, they may only do so in particular circumstances. Small states may only reduce military spending if they believe allied commitments are credible (Goldstein, 1995; DiGiuseppe and Poast, 2018), or leaders are inclined to lower spending (Fuhrmann, 2020). If that is the case, inquiry should emphasize sources of leverage in bargaining between alliance members (Morrow, 1991; Norrlof, 2010; Brooks et al, 2013; Johnson, 2015; Kim, 2016).…”

When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense

“…There are good reasons to question an ally's reliability: Studies show that alliance commitments are violated in war between 25% and 50% of the time (Berkemeier and Fuhrmann 2018;Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000). To the extent that a NATO ally doubts the dependability of the U.S. security guarantee, free-riding may be a risky strategy (see Digiuseppe and Poast 2018;Goldstein 1995). By contrast, leaders who have confidence in American commitments may be more comfortable free-riding.…”

“…I develop a behavioral theory of free-riding. 3 Most research on social dilemmas in international relations emphasizes structural factors such as group size (Axelrod and Keohane 1985), national wealth (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966), or regime type (Digiuseppe and Poast 2018). My focus, by contrast, is on individual leaders.…”