1980
DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400204
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Arms Race Instability and War

Abstract: Historically, half of the interstate wars identified by Singer and Small have been preceded by arms racing; therefore, not all wars stem from weapons competition. Similarly, there are arms races which end pacifically. Here, considering only arms race-related conflicts, the author argues that war may be anticipated at the end of an arms race on the basis of time-constrained mathematical stability characteristics of the involvement.

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Cited by 26 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
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“…Despite numerous empirical analyses, the puzzle of whether alliances and arms races deter or promote war remains unresolved. There are a number of methodological problems that have plagued arms race analyses, ranging from attempts to capture the mutual stimulation presumably implicit to an arms race to questions about what best captures the process of military buildups (for instance, military expenditures vs. weapon systems) or which cases need to be studied to be able to assess a genuine causal push to war from arms racing (compare, among others, Altfeld 1983; Diehl 1983, 1985; Diehl and Crescenszi 1998; Houweling and Siccama 1981; Sample 1997, 1998; Siverson and Diehl 1989; Smith 1980; Wallace 1979; Weede 1980). Alliances possess their own heterogeneous complications.…”
Section: Alliances Arms Races and Rivalry In Retrospectmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite numerous empirical analyses, the puzzle of whether alliances and arms races deter or promote war remains unresolved. There are a number of methodological problems that have plagued arms race analyses, ranging from attempts to capture the mutual stimulation presumably implicit to an arms race to questions about what best captures the process of military buildups (for instance, military expenditures vs. weapon systems) or which cases need to be studied to be able to assess a genuine causal push to war from arms racing (compare, among others, Altfeld 1983; Diehl 1983, 1985; Diehl and Crescenszi 1998; Houweling and Siccama 1981; Sample 1997, 1998; Siverson and Diehl 1989; Smith 1980; Wallace 1979; Weede 1980). Alliances possess their own heterogeneous complications.…”
Section: Alliances Arms Races and Rivalry In Retrospectmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When modeling interactions, Richardson implicitly assumed a pattern of mutual sensitivity : if X reacted to Y, Y reacted to X (see Wagner, Perkins & Taagepera (1975), or Smith (1980) for recent treatments along these lines; and Majeski & Jones (1981) for a research design and results explicitly testing this assumption). The notion of reacting through allies or other proxies was possible to encompass in an n-person model (which Richardson 1960, Ch.…”
Section: Letmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In sharp contrast, Ostrom (1977), who prefers an organizational politics interpretation of military goods fluctuation, uses defense expenditures data uncontrolled for inflation ('even though defense policy makers may make calculations in constant dollars, the budget is proposed, appropriated, and spent in current dollars'). Still others prefer total defense expenditures controlled for price fluctuations (Lambelet, Luterbacher & Allan 1979;Majesky & Jones 1981;Sabrosky 1975;Smith 1980;Wallace 1979; and others), presumably because deflated estimates are both more comparable across countries (expressed in $ US millions, usually), and through time, thus indicating roughly the level of military capability being built and maintained. Yet others have shown that Richardson's approach can even be applied to negotiations data (Hoppman & Smith 1970), specifically the Soviet testban negotiation of 1962-63.…”
Section: Statistical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Elsewhere the deterrent value of arms racing is argued to be low and to tend to diminish over time, through decay of credible threat, proliferation, cumulative risk of crisis, or other reasons (Smith 1980;. Here the defense value of arms racing is argued to have also been over-rated, if military casualties, length of war, and war nation-months are the variables to be minimized by defense.…”
Section: Intraduetianmentioning
confidence: 99%