Armed Opposition Groups’ (and Foreign Fighters’) Abidance by International Human Rights Law: The Issue of Compliance in Syria and Iraq

Amoroso, Daniele

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2_12

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…182 In particular, the aim of measures such as the freezing of assets and weapons embargoes is the weakening of the financial basis of armed groups. 183 Furthermore, other international organisations such as the European Union and a number of individual states have also adopted sanctions against several armed groups. 184 Consequently, through the imposition of these types of sanctions, international organisations have indirectly tried to bring to account different non-state armed groups.…”

Section: Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…182 On the contrary, as indicated by Mastorodimos, 'an individual/civilian, who wilfully takes part in a battle alongside an ANSA [Armed Non-State Actor], although he does not follow instructions nor is part of the command structure of the ANSA, should not be considered as being under the ANSA's control'. 183 Similarly, the UN Commission of Inquiry in Syria reported killings committed by armed civilians associated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and indicated that 'they received information about Syrian civilians reinforcing anti-Government armed groups, which increases problems of effective control even at the level of local FSA groups'. 184 Furthermore, following this reasoning, as individual civilians are expected to comply with specific instructions from the armed group, if they contravene those orders -that is, in case of ultra vires acts -conduct is not likely to be attributed to the group.…”

Section: Conduct Of Individualsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Among these provisions, one of them stated that '[e]fforts shall be made to avoid damage to civilian property and installations resulting from military operations and to make reparations where possible'. 183 Similarly, the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines issued their 'Basic Rules' which contained 'Three Rules and Eight Principles'. One of the eight principles was to compensate all damages.…”

Section: Codes Of Conduct and Internal Rulings Of Armed Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 2012) 183. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 'Code of War', Colombia 1995.…”

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Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law

Álvarez¹

2020

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vi 2.4.A responsibility regime for armed groups under international law: an assessment 2.4.1. The responsibility gap and the rule of law 2.4.2. Prevention of impunity and the right to reparation of victims of armed conflict 2.4.3. The insufficiency of individual criminal responsibility 2. 4.4. Complementarity between individual criminal responsibility and state/collective responsibility 2.4.5. Challenges of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.4.6. Concluding remarks on the assessment of a responsibility regime for armed groups 2.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPING A RESPONSIBILITY REGIME FOR ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3.1. vii responsibility of armed groups: a proposal 3.6. Conclusions CHAPTER 4 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO ARMED GROUPS 4.1. 93 4.2.3. Towards the identification of core principles of attribution for collective entities 95 4.3. Adjusting the core principles of attribution to the conduct of armed groups 96 4.3.1. The issue of structural disparity of armed groups 97 4.3.1.1. Military and political wing 97 4.3.1.2. Centralised and decentralised groups 98 4.3.1.3. Changes of structure over the course of time 4.3.2. Concluding remarks on the adjustment of principles of attribution to armed groups 4.4. Application of rules of attribution to armed groups 4.4.1. Conduct of organs and/or agents of the armed group 4.4.1.1. The notion of organs and agents of armed groups 4.4.1.2. Is the notion of membership of armed groups relevant? 4.4.1.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on a functional approach 4.4.2. Conduct directed and controlled by an armed group 4.4.2.1. Conduct of individuals 4.4.2.2. Conduct of factions and other entities associated with armed groups 4.4.2.3. Concluding remarks: Agency based on direction and control 4.4.3. Acknowledgment of the conduct by the armed group 4.4.3.1. Examples from the practice of armed groups 4.4.3.2. Conditions for its validity 4.4.3.3. Key implications for the process of attribution of conduct 4.5. Conclusions CHAPTER 5 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REPARATIONS BY ARMED GROUPS 5.1. viii 5.3.1. International humanitarian law 5.3.1.1. UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of International Human Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law 5.3.1.2. The ILA Committee on the issue of Reparations for Victims of Armed Conflict 5.3.1.3. The Nairobi declaration on Women's and Girls' Right to a Remedy and Reparation 5.3.1.4. UN Commissions of Inquiry and other monitoring mechanisms 5.3.1.5. 2018 Report on Armed Non-State Actors by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings 5.3.2. International human rights law 5.3.3. International criminal law 5.3.4. Reparations at the domestic level 5.3.5. Concluding remarks on the framework of reparations for violations committed in armed conflict 5.4.The practice of armed groups regarding reparations 5.4.1. Peace agreements between armed groups and states 5.4.2. Unilateral declarations by armed groups 5.4.3. ...

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Section: Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conduct Of Individualsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Codes Of Conduct and Internal Rulings Of Armed Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 2012) 183. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 'Code of War', Colombia 1995.…”

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Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law

Álvarez¹

2020

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Children, Not Soldiers

Capone¹

2020

Handbook of Political Violence and Children

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Recruiting children under the age of 15 years and using them to actively participate in hostilities is forbidden under international law and amounts to an international crime. Nonetheless, parties continue to enlist and conscript children, putting their lives in danger by exploiting them, very often not only for military purposes. After outlining the legal foundations of the prohibition on recruiting and using children, this chapter aims at providing an overview of the tools and strategies, including the UN architecture on children and armed conflict, designed and implemented to thwart the phenomenon of child soldiering. The chapter offers some critical reflections on the necessity to implement effective child-friendly post-conflict and peace-building efforts, in particular disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. In fact, those efforts are still predominantly concerned with adult male fighters and, in most instances, they are unable to adequately address the specific needs of children formerly associated with armed forces or armed non-state actors, including groups labeled as terrorist.

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Armed Opposition Groups’ (and Foreign Fighters’) Abidance by International Human Rights Law: The Issue of Compliance in Syria and Iraq

Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law

Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law

Children, Not Soldiers

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