Aristotle’s Pluralistic Realism

Henry, Devin

doi:10.5840/monist201194210

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Employing this natural kind concept, in the most stripped down fashion, we can say that our natural division races, as they have weak explanatory essences, constitute such kinds. Thus, while we agree with Justin Smith that biological races are not real natural kinds in the typical 17th to 19th century species realist sense, they can yet be said to be ones in a far older Aristotelian sense, as least as interpreted by e.g., Henry (2011). or which have traits that were "a part of the essence of the category" are indefensible. Yet, as said, indefensible also is the notion that historic concepts of race, in the intraspecific sense, entailed these positions.…”

Section: Tells Ussupporting

confidence: 67%

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The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

Fuerst¹

2015

OBG

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Racial constructionists, anti-naturalists, and anti-realists have challenged users of the biological race concept to provide and defend, from the perspective of biology, biological philosophy, and ethics, a biologically informed concept of race. In this paper, an ontoepistemology of biology is developed. What it is, by this, to be "biological real" and "biologically meaningful" and to represent a "biological natural division" is explained. Early 18th century race concepts are discussed in detail and are shown to be both sensible and not greatly dissimilar to modern concepts. A general biological race concept (GBRC) is developed. It is explained what the GBRC does and does not entail and how this concept unifies the plethora of specific ones, past and present. Other race concepts as developed in the philosophical literature are discussed in relation to the GBRC. The sense in which races are both real and natural is explained. Racial essentialism of the relational sort is shown to be coherent. Next, the GBRC is discussed in relation to anthropological discourse. Traditional human racial classifications are defended from common criticisms: historical incoherence, arbitrariness, cluster discordance, etc. Whether or not these traditional human races could qualify as taxa subspeciesor even speciesis considered. It is argued that they could qualify as taxa subspecies by liberal readings of conventional standards. Further, it is pointed out that some species concepts potentially allow certain human populations to be designated as species. It is explained why, by conventional population genetic and statistical standards, genetic differences between major human racial groups are at least moderate. Behavioral genetic differences associated with human races are discussed in general and in specific. The matter of race differences in cognitive ability is briefly considered. Finally, the race concept is defended from various criticisms. First, logical and empirical critiques are dissected. These include: biological scientific, sociological, ontological, onto-epistemological, semantic, and teleological arguments. None are found to have any merit. Second, moral-based arguments are investigated in context to a general ethical frame and are counter-critiqued. Racial inequality, racial nepotism, and the "Racial Worldview" are discussed. What is dubbed the Anti-Racial Worldview is rejected on both empirical and moral grounds. Finally, an area of future investigationthe politics of the destruction of the race conceptis pointed to.

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Section: Tells Ussupporting

confidence: 67%

“…Though, seeHenry (2011) for an interpretation of Aristotelian essentialism which is both biologically defensible and applicable 16. For a contemporary defense of pheneticism, seeLewens (2012a).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

Fuerst¹

2015

OBG

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“…Returning to Greek philosophy for a moment, we find that even Aristotle, with respect to zoological classification, supported a pluralist view (see Parts of Animals I and History of Animals ) that partially resembles Dupre’s view (Henry, 2011). The biological world contains natural kinds marked by real, objective boundaries, but at the same time it is not possible to assign animals to a unique set of mutually exclusive and non-overlapping kinds.…”

Section: Steps Beyond the Ideal Of Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 76%

Relations in KOS: is it possible to couple a common nature with different roles?

Mazzocchi

2017

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Purpose The purpose of this paper, which increases and deepens what was expressed in a previous work (Mazzocchi et al., 2007), is to scrutinize the underlying assumptions of the types of relations included in thesauri, particularly the genus-species relation. Logicist approaches to information organization, which are still dominant, will be compared with hermeneutically oriented approaches. In the light of these approaches, the nature and features of the relations, and what the notion of a priori could possibly mean with regard to them, are examined, together with the implications for designing and implementing knowledge organizations systems (KOS). Design/methodology/approach The inquiry is based on how the relations are described in literature, engaging in particular a discussion with Hjørland (2015) and Svenonius (2004). The philosophical roots of today’s leading views are briefly illustrated, in order to put them under perspective and deconstruct the uncritical reception of their authority. To corroborate the discussion a semantic analysis of specific terms and relations is provided too. Findings All relations should be seen as “perspectival” (not as a priori). On the other hand, different types of relations, depending on the conceptual features of the terms involved, can hold a different degree of “stability.” On this basis, they could be used to address different information concerns (e.g. interoperability vs expressiveness). Research limitations/implications Some arguments that the paper puts forth at the conceptual level need to be tested in application contexts. Originality/value This paper considers that the standpoint of logic and of hermeneutic (usually seen as conflicting) are both significant for information organization, and could be pragmatically integrated. In accordance with this view, an extension of thesaurus relations’ set is advised, meaning that perspective hierarchical relations (i.e. relations that are not logically based but function contingently) should be also included in such a set.

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“…From the time of Aristotle, pluralists have often looked to biology. Species can certainly be divided on the basis of their evo lutionary history, but there are also alternative ways of clas si fying organisms 155,156 .…”

Section: Different Notions Of Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

Stein,

Nielsen,

Hartford

et al. 2024

World Psychiatry

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Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important – psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence‐based and values‐based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi‐level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of “difference‐makers”, as well as a consideration of “lived experience” in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain‐mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain‐mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind‐body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive‐affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.

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Aristotle’s Pluralistic Realism

Cited by 8 publications

References 33 publications

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

Relations in KOS: is it possible to couple a common nature with different roles?

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

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