Aristotle's <i>De Anima</i>

Polansky, Ronald

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511551017

Cited by 162 publications

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“…Even if, in the next clause (416a21-22), τροφή can mean food, it seems better to understand it as the activity of nourishment based on the "τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ" (a21). On this, see Polansky (2007), 213-214 (who nonetheless chooses food to translate τροφή in both clauses, unlike C. Shields) and Johansen (2012), 106-107. 24 The rest of Alexander's text after T.3.…”

Section: 4mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dividing an Apple

Guyomarc’h¹

2020

Nutrition and Nutritive Soul in Aristotle and Aristotelianism

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Alexander's De anima must be distinguished from his lemmatic commentary on the Aristotelian treatise, which is only known to us through testimonies. 2 The De anima is described as "personal" 3 , has a polemical aim and targets a wider, less-specialized audience than commentaries typically do. Nonetheless, in many cases, Alexander's De anima conforms to the agenda and arrangement of its Aristotelian source.The examination of the nutritive soul is one such case: the discussion offers Alexander the opportunity to introduce methodological distinctions, as Aristotle himself did in De anima 2.4. But, whereas Aristotle, at the beginning of De anima 2.4, stresses that in order to determine the essence of a soul power, it is required to look into the activity of this power and, ultimately, into its object 4 , Alexander uses an analogy that does not appear in Aristotle's text:T.1. For we do not divide the soul as though it were composed from the parts into which we divide it as separate things. Rather, we divide the soul by enumerating the powers it has and by ascertaining the differences between them, just as if one were to divide an apple into its fragrance (εἴς τε εὐωδίαν), lustre, shape, and flavour. For dividing an apple in this way is not dividing it as a body (ὡς σώματος), even though the apple is certainly a body, nor as a number. (Alexander, transl. Caston slightly modified)

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Section: 4mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dividing an Apple

Guyomarc’h¹

2020

Nutrition and Nutritive Soul in Aristotle and Aristotelianism

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“…Opposite of flavourlessness is saltiness, the taste that is known as one of the traditional basic tastes in Eastern culture but it is not in the Western one (Polansky, 2007). It may be the reason for the absence of saltiness in English love linguistic metaphors whilst this taste is often used to talk about love and faithfulness in Vietnamese.…”

Section: Natural World and Social Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cultural Study on Linguistic Metaphors of Love in Poetry

Thu¹,

Hoa²

2019

CSM

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Language is one of the cultural factors. Love, an abstract concept is mainly interpreted by metaphors which are considered as part of culture. It is consequently inevitable that the linguistic metaphors of love are under the influence of culture. In this research, we centre on investigating cultural factors in linguistic metaphors of romantic love in Vietnamese modern poetry, and then compare them to those in English. It is shown in our findings that linguistic metaphors of romantic love are considerably influenced by lifestyles, habits and customs and geographical conditions. Therefore, there are many variations in the ways of expressing romantic love between Vietnamese and English although the conceptualization is chiefly similar.

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“…169 calls the acquisition of the ability to recognise things as F (an accidental perceptible): habituation. 455 Or as Polansky 2007. 260 puts it: we perceive accidentally the essence and certain relations of substances, thus: intelligibles.…”

Section: Intrinsic Vs Accidental Perceptiblesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

Hangai¹

2018

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I discuss the account of phantasia of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a most prominent Late-Antique Aristotelian. For Aristotle phantasia is a motion of the perceptive soul that makes possible a great amount of activities and higher cognitions beyond sense-perception. Phantasia became a fundamental psychological concept in the Hellenistic Era: in empiricist epistemology, in action theory as perceptual representation of the external world; in aesthetics as creative imagination.I argue that Alexander proceeds from an Aristotelian framework of parts and capacities of the soul, but unlike Aristotle, he distinguishes a distinct capacity for phantasia. The main reason for this comes from his polemic against the Stoics: they do not acknowledge an activity of phantasia. A distinct activity requires a distinct object, which in turn a distinct capacity. The distinct status of a phantasia-capacity in itself modifies the architecture of the soul in comparison with Aristotle. But in addition Alexander makes important changes in the framework: he makes capacities as basic (and rather modular), and parts and the soul as sets of capacities.The object of phantasia is the residue from perception in activity. The status of this as internal object needs clarification. I show that it is internal on account of being a physical process in the body. Again, I argue that it is the causal object of phantasia: it is the item that provides content to the phantasia-activity by triggering it. But the residue is not an intentional object: it is a representation of something else. I give a reconstruction of Alexander`s account how the residue may be representation. Accordingly, it is a representation in virtue of preserving fully a perceptual content (something that had been perceived); or in virtue of functioning as an equivalent of a fully preserved residue insofar as phantasia completed an incompletely preserved residue. The latter case explains a wide range of cases, in general the fact that phantasia is more prone to error than perception.Finally I analyse the activity of phantasia. I argue that its content is propositional, in particular it is 'S is P'μ a predication of a perceptible feature P of a thing that caused a perception S. First, I show that it is implausible to construe simple cases of phantasia (or perception: for perception has the same type of content as phantasia) as non-propositional, demonstrating that the ὁἴjἷἵt ὄἷaἶiὀg ὁf thἷ ἵὁὀtἷὀt (x ὅἷἷὅ 'whitἷ') iὅ iὀaἶἷὃuatἷ iὀ that at thἷ ἴἷὅt it ὄἷἶuἵἷὅ tὁ ἷxiὅtἷὀtial ὂὄὁὂὁὅitiὁὀὅ ('thἷὄἷ iὅ whitἷ')έ χgaiὀ, I analyse two positive evidences. (1) Alexander`s account of the truth-conditions of phantasia implies propositional content: CEU eTD Collection iv phantasia is about an existent thing, S; and it is such as the thing, P. (2) The account of simultaneous perception (of several perceptibles) entails propositional content, and even uses ἷxamὂlἷὅ aὅ 'thiὅ iὅ whitἷ'έThe phantasia-activity is said to be krisis, which I take to be judgement: primarily because its content is propositional. I ...

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Aristotle's De Anima

Cited by 162 publications

References 0 publications

Dividing an Apple

Dividing an Apple

A Cultural Study on Linguistic Metaphors of Love in Poetry

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

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