Aristotle,De anima3. 2: How do we perceive that we see and hear?

Abstract

The second chapter of book three of theDe animamarks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we perceive that we perceive?’, and suggests an alternative interpretation which would solve many of the difficulties and have the additional merit of restoring unity to the sequence of notes which go to make up the whole chapter.

Aristotle on the Common Sense

“…It is not entirely clear whether it is necessary to infer from this that the perception of sweet and the perception of hot are also one in analogy and one in number, not least because there are significant textual variations in the relevant clause, but I believe that we can make sense of the text even if the inference is made. on the De Anima, different interpretations can be found in De Corte (1932), Charlton (1981), and Osborne (1998).…”

“…Well now, it is clear that to perceive by sight is not one thing; for even when we do not see, we discriminate darkness and light by sight, although not in the same way. Moreover, the seeing thing is also in a way coloured; for each sense organ is receptive of the perceptible without its matter; that is why ¹ Notable discussions of the passage are , Hardie (1976), Modrak (1981a), Kosman (1975), Osborne (1983), Brunschwig (1991, Caston (2002), andJohansen (2006).…”

Perceiving That We See and Hear in Aristotle’s De Anima III 2

“…(iii) the first ὄψις (S1) will see the visible object F and perceive that it (S1) is seeing that object (F). Caston (2002:771) notes against Osborne (1983) that the 'Object Inclusion' thesis excludes that the perceiving that we see is simply 'a matter of being informed that we are seeing, rather than merely dreaming; or discerning that we are seeing rather than, say, hearing'. What is still unclear, however, is the rationale for the very same idea that the 'underlying object' of the first-order activity must be included.…”

“…Johansen argues that the 'different sense' hypothesis is afflicted by the tension it generates with the doctrine of proprietary objects, and the 'same sense' hypothesis by the fact that Aristotle claims in II 5 that, despite containing fire and the other elements, sense organs do not perceive themselves (he further mentions the 'worry aired in Plato's Charmides 165C ff., namely, that if knowledge is of something, it ought to be of something other than itself'). A more radical view is proposed byOsborne, C. (1983). Aristotle, De anima 3.2, How do We Perceive that We See and Hear?…”

Aristotle on Joint Perception and Perceiving that We Perceive

“…The problem is more severe if the relation turns on physiological facts about the organ, as it seems to for Socrates in Theaetetus, but it is present even if we take a more circumspect view about the role of the organ in perception.28 Arguments for versions of AR are given byAquinas 1999;Caston 2002;Hicks 1907;Johansen 2002;Kahn 1975;Kosman 1975;and Osborne 1983. Kosman takes pre-reflective self-consciousness to be at issue, while Caston takes it to be awareness of the experience.…”