Aristotle and Scanlon on Desire and Motivation1

Pearson, Giles

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.003.0005

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Cited by 4 publications

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“…14 Scanlon, for example, takes sources of motivation to be perceived reasons, perceived reasons to be contents of beliefs, and suggests that contents of beliefs are propositions (see 1998, p. 57). I argue this is too restrictive inPearson (2011). For arguments that the contents of perceptual experiences aren't propositions, see, for example,Crane (2009) andMontague (2007).…”

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confidence: 97%

XIV—What Are Sources of Motivation?

Pearson

2015

Proc Aristot Soc

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In this paper I investigate sources of motivation. In particular, I address what sort of thing—what kind of entity—we are motivated by when we are motivated. I argue against two accounts of sources of motivation, in the sense I intend, in favour of a third. On my view, sources of motivation are not, as some think, to be identified with psychological states; nor are they, as others think, to be identified with facts. Instead, sources of motivation should be identified as the contents of psychological states, in particular, the contents of cognitive states.

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confidence: 97%