Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

Abstract

It is standardly assumed that there are three-and only three-ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favored by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects-namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle. Ordinary objects persist. And on our ordinary conception of persistence, they do so by enduring-that is, by being wholly present at each of the times they exist. Thus, to say that Socrates persists is just to say that the whole of him is present at each of the times of his existence. Many philosophers now reject our ordinary conception of persistence in favor of the doctrine of temporal parts. On the standard development of this doctrine, things persist not by enduring but by perduring-that is, by being partially present at each of the times they exist. Thus, to say that Socrates persists is just to say that a part of him (namely, one of his temporal parts) is present at each of the times of his existence. 1 One of the best-known contemporary arguments for the doctrine of temporal parts is David Lewis's argument from temporary intrinsics. This argument identifies an alleged problem for intrinsic change and then suggests that only the temporal-parts theorist has the resources for an adequate solution. To illustrate, suppose that Socrates is seated in the morning (and so bent), but later in afternoon decides to stand up (and so ceases to be bent and becomes straight instead). Such changes in shape are utterly familiar; but they might also seem impossible. For, from the claim that Socrates is seated in the morning, it seems to follow that he is seated; and from the claim that he is standing in the afternoon, it seems to follow that he is standing. (This on the general principle that if Socrates has a property at some time, he has it simpliciter.) But, of course, nothing can be both seated and standing. How, then, can one and the same object, Socrates, have such different shapes at different times? According to Lewis, there are only three solutions: (α) Embrace presentism; (β) Relativize property possession to times; (γ) Accept the doctrine of temporal parts. 1 The doctrine of temporal parts is sometimes developed in such a way that things persist not by having temporal parts at each of the times they exist ('worm theory'), but rather by having counterparts at each of these times ('stage theory'). Cf. Sider 2001 and 2000. In what follows, I f...

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