Arguments from Fairness and Misplaced Priorities in Political Argumentation

Walton, Douglas; Hansen, Hans V.

doi:10.5539/jpl.v6n3p78

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a study that identified different kinds of arguments used by the party leaders in a Canadian provincial election (Hansen and Walton, 2012), twelve instances of use of a particular kind of argument called argument from fairness were found. (Hansen and Walton, 2012) is a report on the types of arguments used during the Ontario provincial election of September 7 to October 6, 2011. The primary purpose of the study was to investigate what kinds of arguments were used by the candidates for political office by collecting a database of arguments identified by a team of students and professors trained (at various levels) in argumentation studies.…”

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the examples (The Globe and Mail Sept. 29, 2011), 'Prison Guard Union Not Endorsing Ontario PC Chain-Gang Plan' 3 from the election project (Hansen and Walton, 2012) can be used to illustrate the use of argument from fairness in political argumentation. How this type of argument can be fitted into a larger network of argumentation can be shown by applying the argument mapping tool of CAS to it.…”

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Baseballs and arguments from fairness

Walton

2013

Artif Intell Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Argumentation schemes represent, at an abstract level, forms of reasoning used in everyday conversational argumentation, and in other contexts, such as legal and scientific argumentation (Bench-Capon and Prakken, 2010). Many of the most common schemes, still recognized as centrally important in the literature, were identified in (Hastings, 1963), (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969), and (Kienpointner, 1992). The schemes described and explained in chapter 9 of (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008) include the ones for argument from expert opinion, argument from sign, argument from commitment, argument from lack of knowledge, practical reasoning (argument from goal to action), argument from cause to effect, the sunk costs argument, argument from analogy, three kinds of ad hominem argument, and four kinds of slippery slope argument. Historically, schemes are the historical descendants of the topics, representing common types of arguments, originally catalogued by Aristotle. Two schemes that we will have to use in this paper are the one for argument from expert opinion and the one for argument from lack of knowledge, widely known in the literature on fallacies as the argument from ignorance. To explain how schemes work, it is best to begin with a description of these two. The simplest, and in many ways the most intuitive scheme for argument from expert opinion, can nicely be expressed in the form below. Major Premise: E is an expert. Minor Premise: E asserts that A is true (false). Conclusion: A is true (false). The reader might be interested comparing this form with a slightly more complex version of it given in (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 310). This form of argument is defeasible, meaning that it only holds tentatively in a given case, subject to the possibility of new evidence might come in that can defeat it. It is important to recognize that argument from expert opinion is subject to critical questioning, and that therefore it needs to be treated as an open-ended type of argument rather than as a conclusive one of the kind that might be represented by deductive logic or any other monotonic system where the addition of new premises will not make the argument default. This set of critical questions matches this scheme for argument from expert opinion (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 310). CQ 1 : Expertise Question. How credible is E as an expert source? CQ 2 : Field Question. Is E an expert in the field that A is in? CQ 3 : Opinion Question. What did E assert that implies A? CQ 4 : Trustworthiness Question. Is E personally reliable as a source? CQ 5 : Consistency Question. Is A consistent with what other experts assert? CQ 6 : Backup Evidence Question. Is E's assertion based on evidence? CQ 1 questions the expert's level of mastery of the field F. CQ 4 questions the expert's trustworthiness. For example, if the expert has something to lose or gain by saying A is true or false, this evidence would suggest that the expert may not be personally reliable. The asking of the critical question defeats the argument temp...

show abstract

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Schemes For Argument From Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Baseballs and arguments from fairness

Walton

2013

Artif Intell Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There is a rich tradition of argument mapping and notation conventions in philosophy and argumentation theory (Toulmin 1958), informal logic (e.g., Whately 1836), law (e.g., Wigmore 1937) and political discourse (e.g., Walton and Hansen 2013). In these research areas, argument diagrams are primarily developed and used for analyzing argumentation (Reed et al 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Show me your opinion. Perceptual cues in creating and reading argument diagrams

Amelsvoort

Maes

2016

Instr Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In argument diagrams, perceptual cues are important to aid understanding. However, we do not know what perceptual cues are used and produced to aid understanding. We present two studies in which we investigate (1) which spatial, graphical and textual elements people spontaneously use in creating for-against argument diagrams, and (2) how people interpret these elements to find out one's argumentative position. In the production study, participants were presented with arguments in favor and against a societally relevant topic and were asked to graphically represent the arguments such that their position (for or against) would become clear to a reader. For the perception study, we manipulated the argument diagrams created in study 1 into six different versions by deleting text, graphic cues and color. Participants saw one version of the diagrams; they were asked to judge the argumentative position, and to explain what they based their judgment on. We found that-in spite of individual differences-natural sources were used by all producers, for example by creating a well-formed structure, or by using spatial and graphical elements to separate or highlight arguments. Furthermore, although interpreting the argument diagrams was best done when the combination of text and graphic cues was present, graphic cues alone seemed to be very important for interpretation. We conclude with a cautionary hierarchy of perceptual cues in argument diagrams.

show abstract

Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Moral Foundations in Argumentation

Landowska,

Budzynska,

Zhang

2024

Argumentation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper introduces moral argument analytics, a technology that provides insights into the use of moral arguments in discourse. We analyse five socio-political corpora of argument annotated data from offline and online discussions, totalling 240k words with 9k arguments, with an average annotation accuracy of 78%. Using a lexicon-based method, we automatically annotate these arguments with moral foundations, achieving an estimated accuracy of 83%. Quantitative analysis allows us to observe statistical patterns and trends in the use of moral arguments, whereas qualitative analysis enables us to understand and explain the communication strategies in the use of moral arguments in different settings. For instance, supporting arguments often rely on Loyalty and Authority, while attacking arguments use Care. We find that online discussions exhibit a greater diversity of moral foundations and a higher negative valence of moral arguments. Online arguers often rely more on Harm rather than Care, Degradation rather than Sanctity. These insights have significant implications for AI applications, particularly in understanding and predicting human and machine moral behaviours. This work contributes to the construction of more convincing messages and the detection of harmful or biased AI-generated synthetic content.

show abstract

Arguments from Fairness and Misplaced Priorities in Political Argumentation

Cited by 4 publications

References 22 publications

Baseballs and arguments from fairness

Baseballs and arguments from fairness

Show me your opinion. Perceptual cues in creating and reading argument diagrams

Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Moral Foundations in Argumentation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About