Argument, Inference and Dialectic

Pinto, Robert C.

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0783-1

Cited by 111 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…2 * * * Let me mention two advantages of broadening our account of reasons along the lines I propose. (a) Since one species of cognitive attitude consists of a range of doxastic or belief-like attitudes -suspecting that something is the case, being inclined to believe it, expecting it will turn out to be the case, presuming it to be the case, as well as straightforwardly or fully believing it to be the case -this proposal opens up the possibility of adopting a qualitative version of evidence proportionalism, 3 a view according to 1 In my view, there are in fact conscious attitudes other than propositional attitudes for which we can have reasons -reasons for liking someone, reasons for distrusting someone, and so on -see Pinto 2001, chapter 2 ("Generalizing the notion of argument"), esp. pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Argumentation and the Force of Reasons

Pinto

2009

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Argumentation involves offering and/or exchanging reasons– either reasons for adopting various attitudes towards specific propositional contents or else reasons for acting in various ways. This paper develops the idea that the force of reasons is through and through a normative force because what goodreasons accomplish is precisely to give one a certain sort of entitlement to do what they are reasons for. The paper attempts to shed light on what it is to have a reason, how the sort of entitlement arising from reasons differs from other species ofentitlement and how the norms by which such entitlement is assessed obtain their status as norms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Argumentation and the Force of Reasons

Pinto

2009

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“…As to sententially-driven aspects, the proposition can be presented as the result of an inference of the speaker and/or as inferable by the hearer. When presenting a proposition as inferred, speakers index their own thought processes; this has two argumentatively relevant implications: the hearer may be invited to follow the same path of reasonings [26]; at the same time the hearer is warned that the proposition is a debatable standpoint. Moreover, inferred propositions hints to the available premises excluding direct access to the encoded situation as well as hearsay or report as sources of information.…”

Section: Intersubjective Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidently epistential adverbs are argumentative indicators: A corpus-based study

Musi

Rocci

2017

AAC

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Abstract. Argumentative indicators of discourse relations constitute crucial cues for the mining of arguments. However, a comprehensive lexicon of these linguistic devices is so far lacking due to the scarcity of corpora argumentatively annotated and the absence of an empirically validated analytic methodology. Recent studies have shown that modals, that express that things might be otherwise, and evidentials, that point to the presence of information sources, are good candidates to work as argumentative indicators. On these grounds, we propose a systematic, non-language specific corpus-based procedure to identify indicators of argumentative discourse relations. We test the design of a multi-level annotation through the analysis of the English and Italian epistential adverbs evidently and evidentemente in comparable corpora of newspaper articles. We show that the annotation guidelines achieve consistent analytical results with expert annotators. Data analysis reveals that the two adverbs work as argumentative indicator both at the structural and at the inferential level: besides pointing to the presence of premises-conclusion relations, they recurrently pattern with causal argument schemes from the effect to the cause. The Italian adverb evidentemente is less polysemous and more frequent, thus working as a more reliable indicator.

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“…The gap between a normative theory of argument and its practice has been considered in several papers (for example, Pinto 2001;Johnson 2005;Kvernbekk 2012). It is clear that a normative account such as Walton's should not be solely criticized on empirical grounds, but I think that by applying the method of analysis, we lose track of the way in which these kinds of arguments are dealt with in actual practice and how we grasp the idea of defeasibility and subsequently respond to it in an active way, when we do not agree with the supported claim.…”

Section: Quotations As Instances Of "The Appeal To Expert Opinion" Armentioning

confidence: 99%

The Authority of Citations and Quotations in Academic Papers

Carrascal

2014

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I consider some uses of citations in academic writing and analyze them as instances of the "appeal to expert opinion" argumentative scheme to show that the critical questions commonly linked to this scheme are difficult to apply. I argue that, by considering citations as special communicative and argumentative situated acts, their use in real practice can be explained more adequately. Adaptation to the audience and to the social constraints is common and necessary in order to collaborate with others and to advance in a discipline, but also to attain rhetorical goals that differ from strictly cognitive ones. Résumé

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Argument, Inference and Dialectic

Cited by 111 publications

References 0 publications

Argumentation and the Force of Reasons

Argumentation and the Force of Reasons

Evidently epistential adverbs are argumentative indicators: A corpus-based study

The Authority of Citations and Quotations in Academic Papers

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