Argentina’s curious response to the global investment regime: external constraints, identity, or both?

Haftel, Yoram Z.; Levi, Hila

doi:10.1057/s41268-019-00174-8

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…As already mentioned, in the late 2000s, host countries became more cognizant of the risks and less certain of the benefits of IIAs. This resulted in a 'backlash' against the IIA Regime in some quarters and a mounting pressure to reduce exposure to it by either not signing new IIAs, renegotiating or terminating them, or increasing their precision (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013;Manger and Peinhardt, 2017;Haftel and Thompson, 2018; but see Haftel and Levi, 2020). Several HIDCs did just that: they halted and reviewed their IIA programs, and some of them decided to terminate many of their older BITs, in some cases to be replaced by IIAs with greater regulatory space.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

High-Income Developing Countries, FDI Outflows and the International Investment Agreement Regime

2021

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The international investment agreement regime (IIA Regime) is composed of thousands of IIAs and a system of investor–state dispute settlement. Historically, high-income developing countries (HIDCs) were part of the global South and thus ‘hosts’ of foreign direct investment (FDI). Increasingly, however, these countries have become ‘home’ to investors who are hosted and exposed to political risk abroad. Representing both home and host country interests simultaneously, how do HIDCs balance these crosscutting pressures? We argue that as the position of an HIDC shifts from mostly a recipient towards a sender of significant amounts of FDI, it will be more willing to provide protection to foreign investors at the expense of state regulatory space in its IIAs, thereby increasing its exposure to the IIA Regime. Employing an original data set that measures this exposure for sixty-four HIDCs over six decades, we first show that the degree of HIDC exposure to the IIA Regime varies a great deal. Using a general method of moments (GMM) analysis and controlling for a host of confounding factors, we demonstrate that, indeed, higher levels of FDI outflows as a share of the national economy result in greater exposure to the IIA Regime.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

High-Income Developing Countries, FDI Outflows and the International Investment Agreement Regime

2021

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“…States' responses to this "legitimacy crisis" (Waibel et al, 2010;Abebe and Ginsburg, 2019;Poulsen, 2020) have been many and diverse (Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016;Haftel and Levi, 2019;Berge, 2020). The debate concerning BITs however, has largely focused on what commitments the future generation of BITs should include (UNCTAD, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic capacity and preference attainment in international economic negotiations

Berge

Stiansen

2022

Rev Int Organ

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What determines states’ ability to influence the contents of international institutions? Extant scholarship on international economic negotiations highlights the importance of political and economic capacity in negotiations. In this article, we argue that another structural source of negotiating power has been overlooked: bureaucratic capacity. Building on in-depth interviews with a large sample of international economic negotiators, we develop a theory of how differences in bureaucratic capacity can give states advantages in bilateral negotiations. We test our theory on a dataset of bilateral investment treaties. To measure preference attainment, we combine a unique repository of states’ public negotiating mandates called model treaties and the texts of finalized investment treaties to compute the verbatim distances between states’ stated preferences and the treaties they negotiate. We then show that states with greater bureaucratic capacity than their counterparts tend to achieve higher preference attainment in investment treaty negotiations. Our results have important implications for scholarship on international negotiations and for policy-makers engaged in investment policy reform.

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“…Argentina's ISDS experience and unexpected approach towards BITs has been researched through indepth case studies, see for example(Calvert, 2018b;Haftel & Levi, 2020).2 Overall, the association between ISDS cases a state has faced and how many BITs they have resorted to unilaterally terminate or renegotiate is weak, see FigureA1in Online Appendix, available on the Review of International Organizations webpage.…”

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confidence: 99%

Constraints and incentives in the investment regime: How bargaining power shapes BIT reform

Huikuri

2022

Rev Int Organ

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States have increasingly started to terminate and renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Dominant explanations have however overlooked the underlying bargaining dynamic of investment treaty negotiations. This paper argues that while states initially in a weaker negotiating position have the strongest incentives to change their existing BITs, their ability to do so is constrained by their bargaining power. Such states become more likely to demand renegotiation or exit dissatisfying BITs if they have experienced sufficient changes in their bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner. This paper identifies observable implications of the weaker states’ incentives and bargaining power constraints for adjusting their bilateral investment treaty commitments. Leveraging a panel dataset on 2,623 BITs ranging from 1962 to 2019, interaction effects between bargaining power and incentives stemming from rationalist and bounded rationality assumptions about states’ decision-making are analyzed in relation to the occurrence of renegotiations and terminations. The paper finds that change in bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner is an important factor underlying the weaker states’ ability to terminate or renegotiate BITs, contributing to the study of investment regime reform and exit from international institutions.

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Argentina’s curious response to the global investment regime: external constraints, identity, or both?

Cited by 5 publications

References 38 publications

High-Income Developing Countries, FDI Outflows and the International Investment Agreement Regime

High-Income Developing Countries, FDI Outflows and the International Investment Agreement Regime

Bureaucratic capacity and preference attainment in international economic negotiations

Constraints and incentives in the investment regime: How bargaining power shapes BIT reform

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