Are visual stimuli sufficient to evoke motor information?

Borghi, Anna M.; Bonfiglioli, Claudia; Lugli, Luisa; Ricciardelli, Paola; Rubichi, Sandro; Nicoletti, Roberto

doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2006.10.003

Cited by 94 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…A four-way ANOVA, with relation type (basic-level taxonomic, thematic), object manipulability (manipula- manipulable object concepts (Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, et al, 2007;Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003;Myung et al, 2006;Tucker & Ellis, 2004). The present findings go further by highlighting the role of action in the development of manipulable object concepts as early as age 5.…”

Section: Analysis Of Children's Performancesupporting

confidence: 61%

Object manipulability affects children's and adults' conceptual processing

Kalénine

Bonthoux

2008

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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A large body of evidence from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology supports the idea that there are different kinds of concepts. Artifact concepts would be mostly characterized by function, whereas natural kinds would be predominantly organized around perceptual information. Numerous studies in children show that functional similarities drive induction, name generalization, and categorization for artifacts from

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Section: Analysis Of Children's Performancesupporting

confidence: 61%

Object manipulability affects children's and adults' conceptual processing

Kalénine

Bonthoux

2008

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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“…First, the things categorised in categorical perception of expressions of emotion are events rather than configurations or anything static. (Note that this is consistent the fact that static stimuli can trigger categorical perception; aer all, static stimuli can also trigger motor representations of things like grasping (Borghi et al 2007). ) Second, these events are not mere physiological reactions (as we might intuitively take blushing to be) but things like frowning and smiling, whose performance involves motor expertise.…”

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confidence: 68%

Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?

Butterfill

2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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What evidence could bear on questions about whether humans ever perceptually experience any of another's mental states, and how might those questions be made precise enough to test experimentally? is paper focusses on emotions and their expression. It is proposed that research on perceptual experiences of physical properties provides one model for thinking about what evidence concerning expressions of emotion might reveal about perceptual experiences of others' mental states. is proposal motivates consideration of the hypothesis that categorical perception of expressions of emotion occurs, can be facilitated by information about agents' emotions, and gives rise to phenomenal expectations. It is argued that the truth of this hypothesis would support a modest version of the claim that humans sometimes perceptually experience some of another's mental states. Much available evidence is consistent with, but insufficient to establish, the truth of the hypothesis. We are probably not yet in a position to know whether humans ever perceptually experience others' mental states.

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“…By using their original grounded features to set the parameters of the schema structure, the sensorimotor schemas will act as they would in the presence of a real world instance of the replayed concept. For example, if a concept of a mug is thought of, the correct grasp parameters for gripping the mug can be loaded into the gripping schema, in line with studies on automatic evocation of motor programs upon object perception [20] [21], which is a form of grounded cognition [22]. Vague concepts must be contextualized before they can be replayed.…”

Section: Schema-based Simulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Artificial Dasein: Solving the Frame Problem with Incremental Contextualization

Harvey¹

2018

OALib

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In this paper, we give an account of a rationally behaving agent-an artificial Dasein-which can perceive the world in terms of relevance to its own goals.The way we achieve this is through a process of incremental contextualization of goals and constraints that range from the purely conceptual and abstract to the well-defined and physical. The model described in this paper combines a conceptual hierarchy with a schema structure, and leads to an account of practical reasoning which relies on two novel ideas: the recursive selection of increasingly contextualized subgoals, and the tractable determination of behavioral consequences through simulation. The present account seeks to provide an outline for developing an agent which does not suffer from the frame problem due to the way in which it incrementally contextualizes its goals until they can be achieved unreflectively by matching them to pre-learned schemas. We believe that this account can lead to a form of artificial intelligence more powerful than traditional attempts based on formal logic.

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Are visual stimuli sufficient to evoke motor information?

Cited by 94 publications

References 27 publications

Object manipulability affects children's and adults' conceptual processing

Object manipulability affects children's and adults' conceptual processing

Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?

Artificial Dasein: Solving the Frame Problem with Incremental Contextualization

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