2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.11.001
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008

Abstract: In the European policy debate, tradable green certificates (TGC) have been suggested to be a superior regulatory framework for promoting the diffusion of renewable electricity technologies. The purpose of this paper is to assess the performance of the Swedish TGC system, contributing to the European debate on the suitability of different types of frameworks. The expectations of the TGC system were that it would: a) be effective in terms of increasing the supply of "green" electricity; b) do this in a cost effe… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
82
0
1

Year Published

2010
2010
2017
2017

Publication Types

Select...
6
3
1

Relationship

1
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 177 publications
(84 citation statements)
references
References 34 publications
(54 reference statements)
1
82
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…In contrast, quotas promote primarily those technologies which are closest to the market, and can bring about large rents for these technologies [32,37,38]. In the Swedish tradable certificate scheme, observed rents amounted to as much as 55-75% of the overall remuneration paid to electricity producers [39]. The non-differentiation between construction dates under quota systems also leads to a "dynamic disincentive to invest" in learning technologies: If a technology benefits from learning-by-doing and suffers from spillovers, there is a strong incentive to postpone an investment [25,37,40].…”
Section: Policy Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, quotas promote primarily those technologies which are closest to the market, and can bring about large rents for these technologies [32,37,38]. In the Swedish tradable certificate scheme, observed rents amounted to as much as 55-75% of the overall remuneration paid to electricity producers [39]. The non-differentiation between construction dates under quota systems also leads to a "dynamic disincentive to invest" in learning technologies: If a technology benefits from learning-by-doing and suffers from spillovers, there is a strong incentive to postpone an investment [25,37,40].…”
Section: Policy Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The system has not encouraged the development of technologies which in the UK are seen as promising options for the future, such as offshore wind, solar cells and wave/tidal power, since they are too expensive and/or considered too risky (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). The Swedish electricity certificate system came into force in 2003 and, similar to the UK system, has primarily benefited actors who invest in relatively mature technologies; in 2008, for example, 70% of the renewable production in the system consisted of biomass-based electricity production in industrial back-pressure plants and combined heat and power plants, whereas novel technologies found it hard to compete within the TGC regime (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). The outcome of the TGC system in Flanders is similar.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The key economies this policy leverages are those of static economy of scale at the CoPS project level and dynamic economy of scale at the equipment level. Equally important is an efficient tradable certificate market [35].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%