Are There Any Natural Rights?

Abstract

SHALL advance the thesis that if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free. By saying that there is this right, I mean that in the absence of certain special conditions which are consistent with the right being an equal right, any adult human being capable of choice (i) has the right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons.2 I have two reasons for describing the equal right of all men to be free as a natural right; both of them were always emphasized by the classical theorists of natural rights. (i) This right is one which all men have if they are capable of choice; they have it qua men and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some special relation to each other. (2) This right is not created or conferred by men's voluntary action; I was first stimulated to think along these lines by Mr. Stuart Hampshire, and I have reached by different routes a conclusion similar to his. 2 Further explanation of the perplexing terminology of freedom is, I fear, necessary. Coercion includes, besides preventing a person from doing what he chooses, making his choice less eligible by threats; restraint includes any action designed to make the exercise of choice impossible and so includes killing or enslaving a person. But neither coercion nor restraint includes competition. In terms of the distinction between "having a right to" and " being at liberty to," used above and further discussed in Section I, B, all men may have, consistently with the obligation to forbear from coercion, the liberty to satisfy if they can such at least of their desires as are not designed to coerce or injure others, even though in fact, owing to scarcity, one man's satisfaction causes another's frustration. In conditions of extreme scarcity this distinction between competition and coercion will not be worth drawing; natural rights are only of importance "where peace is possible" (Locke). Further, freedom (the absence of coercion) can be valueless to those victims of unrestricted competition too poor to make use of it; so it will be pedantic to point out to them that though starving they are free. This is the truth exaggerated by the Marxists whose identification of poverty with lack of freedom confuses two different evils. '75

Ethical Theory and Stakeholder-Related Decisions: The Role of Stakeholder Culture

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“…This is evident whether one takes a will theory or an interest theory approach to human rights. In will theory, one's right is connected to one's power of choice with respect to the right of others to interfere with or frustrate our projects (Hart 1967). In interest theory, only our interests that 7 are of sufficient weight to generate counterpart duties in others are those that are the subject of rights (Raz 1986).…”

Η διάκριση μεταξύ θετικής και αρνητικής ελευθερίας κατά τον Isaiah Berlin και ο ορισμός της ελευθερίας ως αρνητικής ιδέας

“…Τα δύο πρώτα ζεύγη είναι αυτά που περιέχουν τη διάκριση μεταξύ ελευθερίας και δικαιώματος και που στην πολιτική φιλοσο φία έκαναν έντονα αισθητή την παρουσία τους8. Έτσι η βασική διάκριση του Bentham μεταξύ δικαιώματος και ελευθερίας διεισδύει στη σύγχρονη φιλο σοφία και βρίσκει ακριβείς αντιστοιχίες σ' αυτό που ο Hofheld αποκαλεί 'δικαίωμα' (right) σε αντιδιαστολή προς το 'προνόμιο' (privilege), ο Hart 'δικαίωμα απαίτησης' (claim-right) σε αντιδιαστολή προς το 'δικαίωμα' (right), ή ο Raphael 'δικαίωμα ενέργειας' (right of action) σε αντιδιαστολή προς το 'δικαίωμα απολαβής' (right of recipience) και ούτω κάθε εξής (Hart 1955: 172, Raphael 1967.…”