Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek?

Abstract

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.Legally mandated reductions in the workweek can be either a constraint on individuals' choice or a tool to coordinate individuals' preferences for lower work hours. We confront these two hypotheses by studying the consequences of the workweek reduction in France from 39 to 35 hours, which was first applied to large firms in 2000. Using the timing difference by firm size to set up a quasi-experiment and data from the French labor force survey, we show that the law constrained the choice of a significant number of individuals: dual-job holdings increased, some workers in large firms went to small firms where hours were not constrained, and others were replaced by cheaper, unemployed individuals as relative hourly wages increased in large firms. Employment of persons directly affected by the law declined, although the net effect on aggregate employment was not significant. JEL Classification Numbers: E24, J22, C21

The Effect of a Reduced Statutory Workweek on Familial Long-Term Care in Korea

“…For example, in Korea, due to the 4-hr reduction in the statutory workweek, which is assessed in the current study also, actual workweeks declined by 43 minutes when male and female workers were analyzed together (H. R. Kim & Lee, 2012) and by 93 minutes when only male workers were analyzed (E. H.-W. Kim, Lee, & Do, 2018). The Japanese and French governments also shortened statutory workweeks, and employees in these countries did work fewer hours as a result (see Estevão & Sa, 2006;Goux et al, 2014;Saffer & Lamiraud, 2012, for France;and Kawaguchi et al, 2013, for Japan).…”

The effect of hours of work on social interaction

“…Since the law requires small firms to comply within two years, it seems doubtful that anyone would switch for a two year only advantage. Estevao and Sa (2006) found no significant shift from large firms to small firms due to the law. Also, workers in large firms are not likely to switch into the civil service since civil service employment requires passing a competitive exam and again the advantage would only last for two years.…”

“…Furthermore, they highlight that people having more membership activities are also likely to have more social contacts. Estevao and Sa (2006) used data from the French Survey of Employment and used the timing difference by firm size to set up a difference in difference specification. They find that the law increased dual-job holdings and that some workers were replaced by cheaper, unemployed individuals as relative hourly wages increased in large firms.…”

Do reductions of standard hours affect employment transitions?: Evidence from Chile

“…Speci…cally, they recognize that they do not have instruments that a¤ect the decision to reduce working hours without having an impact on economic outcomes. A di¤erent conclusion is reached by Estevão and Sa (2008). They use the French Labour Force Survey and exploit the time di¤erence of the application of Aubry I (by …rm size) to set up a quasi-experiment which study the e¤ect of the law on workers welfare.…”