Are judges biased by labor market conditions?

Ichino, Andrea; Polo, Michele; Rettore, Enrico

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00269-6

Cited by 144 publications

(134 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…A similar result has been found recently, in a different context, by Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003). They look at whether judgments about firing litigations are based only on a employee's misconduct and find instead that judges' decisions tend to be significantly more favourable to employees in Italian regions where unemployment is higher and vice versa.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Scoppa

2007

Empir Econ

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Scoppa

2007

Empir Econ

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“…Also, Goerke and Pannenberg (2004) find in a more detailed analysis that between 1990 and 2002 in Germany, on average, 14% of all employment relationships terminated were accompanied by severance payments. Additionally, Ichino et al (2003) find that in Italy, 22% of all dismissals are taken to court and after all, 17% of the dismissals are overruled by court. Furthermore, they show in an empirical and (game) theoretical approach that judges might be biased by the labour market situation when settling the dismissal dispute.…”

Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Firing costs, severance payments, judicial mistakes and unemployment

Stähler

2008

Labour Economics

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Zusammenfassung:In the discussion about employment protection, little attention has been given to judicial mistakes. In most countries, only in the case of dismissals due to economic reasons, the employee is entitled to a severance payment. Given judicial mistakes when reviewing a dismissal, shirkers might falsely receive a severance payment while non-shirker might not. At fighting unemployment, increasing the level of severance payments can increase employment for small judicial mistakes and effectively dominate the pure firing costs which leave ambiguous effects on employment. For large judicial mistakes, the opposite can hold and severance payments can decrease employment. JEL Klassifikation: AbstractIn the discussion about employment protection, little attention has been given to judicial mistakes. In most countries, only in the case of dismissals due to economic reasons, the employee is entitled to a severance payment. Given judicial mistakes when reviewing a dismissal, shirkers might falsely receive a severance payment while non-shirker might not. At fighting unemployment, increasing the level of severance payments can increase employment for small judicial mistakes and effectively dominate the pure firing costs which leave ambiguous effects on employment. For large judicial mistakes, the opposite can hold and severance payments can decrease employment. Theme: Labour Market Policy

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“…A first explanation refers to multiple equilibria that arise from reverse causation. If judges are sympathetic toward workers and their decisions are biased by bad local labor market conditions, and if pro-worker judgments also increase firing costs and reversely hinder the labor market outcome, two equilibria may arise: 1) high employment rate and pro-employer judgments and 2) low employment rate and pro-worker judgments (Ichino et al 2003). It is also possible that certain exogenous but unknown mechanism of judge transfers explains the divergence in Tokyo and Osaka.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Ichino et al (2003) argued, judges may be biased against the unfavorable condition of the labor market. In the case of Italian litigations, judges are subjectively compassionate with workers and adjudicate in favor of them when the local unemployment rate is high (Ichino et al 2003). Conversely, judges may also adjudicate in favor of firms during recessions.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Case law is under continuous revision, and judgments are volatile against changes in social norms or economic conditions. Ichino et al (2003) analyzed a detailed dataset pertaining to an Italian bank and indicated that judges have expressed unbalanced leniency toward workers in judgments when the local labor market is in a depression. While a court may exogenously establish new decision standards that affect the amount of expected firing costs to firms, judge bias, such as this, or replacement of social norms also have a reverse effect on court decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The economic costs of court decisions concerning dismissals in Japan: Identification by judge transfers

Okudaira

2018

International Review of Law and Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING DISMISSALS IN JAPAN: IDENTIFICATION BY JUDGE TRANSFERS Hiroko OkudairaThe 11 AbstractThe goal of this paper is to detect the degree to which court decisions control the stringency of employment protection and to investigate how such judicial discretion affects labor market performance. However, identification difficulty arises because court decisions are volatile against economic and social conditions. This paper overcomes the endogeneity problem by exploiting the triennial judge transfer system in Japan, or the exogenous allocation of judges to prefectures. A key finding is that the prefecture employment rate is reduced by approximately 1.4% if a prefecture receives more pro-worker judgments than pro-employer ones in a given year.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J65, K31, K41

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Are judges biased by labor market conditions?

Cited by 144 publications

References 16 publications

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Firing costs, severance payments, judicial mistakes and unemployment

The economic costs of court decisions concerning dismissals in Japan: Identification by judge transfers

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