Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "acquired sociopathy" [1]

Roskies, Adina L.

doi:10.1080/0951508032000067743

Cited by 119 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…that emotional processes are not causally necessary for moral judgement [2], or that the motivation to act is merely contingently related to moral judgement (since psychopathic subjects display amoral behaviour). [12] These conclusions rest on one important assumption: that convergence between the normal (nonpsychopathic) population and the psychopathic population provides us with sufficient grounds for ascribing to the psychopathic subject the capacity to make moral judgements. This in turn presumes that the judgements made by the majority of subjects in the normal population are the morally right ones to make.…”

Section: Trolleyology: What Does the Convergence In Judgement Telmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From this, the motivation externalist, for instance, draws the conclusion that the amoral behaviour observed in psychopathy shows that moral judgement and the motivation to act are merely contingently related. [12] The ascription of the capacity for moral understanding to psychopathic subjects on the basis of convergence in response hypothetical dilemmas (such as to Trolley Problems) assumes that such convergence is indeed revelatory of this capacity. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question this assumption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Ayob

Thornton

2014

Theor Med Bioeth

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Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgement. The Trolley Problem is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the Trolley Problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This in turn is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgement in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgement is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject's inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to Trolley Problems doesn't tell us very much about the psychopathic subject's capacity to make moral judgements, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

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Section: Trolleyology: What Does the Convergence In Judgement Telmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Ayob

Thornton

2014

Theor Med Bioeth

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“…Here, denying that they are appears much more promising, as many of the judgmental and behavioral patterns found in psychopathic patients and offenders are more plausibly explained by motivational than by cognitive deficiencies. Psychopaths (and acquired sociopaths) know right from wrong, but do not care (Cima et al 2010;Roskies 2003).…”

Section: Is There An Asymmetry At All?mentioning

confidence: 99%

No excuses for moral realism

Sauer

2017

Philos Stud

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Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral ignorance excuse. I argue that the exculpatory force of moral ignorance-or lack thereof-poses a thus far overlooked challenge to moral realism. I show, firstly, that if there were any mind-independent moral truths, we would not expect there to be an asymmetry in exculpatory force between moral and ordinary ignorance at all. I then consider several attempts the realist might make to deny or accommodate this datum, and show why none of them work.

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“…Moreover, according to the Humean, desires can fill this gap in a way that suggests elegant explanations of both widespread moral motivation and motivational failures associated 1 Proponents of some version or another of this view include Foot (2002), Stocker (1979), Williams (1981), Brink (1986;1997), Railton (1986), Smith (1994, ch. 4), Mele (1995;1996;, Svavarsdóttir (1999), Roskies (2003), Zangwill (2008a;2008b) and Sinhababu (2009). 2 The labels "internalism" and "externalism" derive from Falk (1986).…”

Section: Humean Externalism and The Argument From Depressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression

Swartzer

2017

JESP

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Several prominent philosophers have argued that the fact that depressed agents sometimes make moral judgments without being appropriately motivated supports Humean externalism – the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are distinct from or “external” to an agent’s motivationally inert moral judgments. This essay argues that such motivational failures do not, in fact, provide evidence for this view. I argue that, if the externalist argument from depression is to undermine a philo-sophically important version of internalism, it must make use of a general assumption about motivational states. However, at a reasonable level of abstraction, the needed assumption also implies that even desires could not be effective sources of motivation. For, just as depressed agents might sometimes lack motivation to act consistently with their moral judgments, they also sometimes lack motivation to pursue their desires. Moreover, the most plausible responses that Humeans can give to this general argument undermine the externalist case against internalism. Thus, there is a deep tension between the argument from depression for externalism and a fundamental Humean commitment.

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Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "acquired sociopathy" [1]

Cited by 119 publications

References 14 publications

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

No excuses for moral realism

Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression

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