Are altered states of consciousness detrimental, neutral or helpful for the origins of symbolic cognition? A response to Hodgson and Lewis-Williams

Abstract

We respond to the commentaries by Hodgson and Lewis-Williams by clarifying the novelty of our theory. We argue that whenever Turing instabilities of neural activity play a role in generating visual hallucinations, they do more than shape the geometric patterns. Their relatively autonomous self-organization is a source of intrinsic value related to their selfmaintenance as a pattern of activity, and they would also thereby decouple ''higher-level'' stages of neural processing from external stimulation, thus facilitating a more abstract mode of cognition. These additional features of our proposal support Hodgson and Lewis-Williams in their respective theories about the very first origins of human artistic activity. We also evaluate the critical literature regarding the possibility of ritualized enaction of altered states of consciousness (ASC) in early prehistory. We conclude that ASC were indeed possible, and suggest that they were likely involved in facilitating the social development of more symbolic forms of life and mind.

What processes sparked off symbolic representations? A reply to Hodgson and an alternative perspective

“…Under this view, the production of early geometric engravings would have derived from the influence of the visual system, attuned to perceive those geometric primitives, on the motor system engaged in producing marks. This theory has several weaknesses, which are only marginally highlighted in the literature (Froese et al, 2014;Verpooten and Nelissen 2012).…”

Comments on the paper “Are altered states of consciousness detrimental, useful or helpful for the origins of symbolic cognition? A response to Hodgson and Lewis Williams”, by T Froese, A Woodward and T Ikegami

“…In their latest paper “Are altered states of consciousness detrimental, useful or helpful for the origins of symbolic cognition? A response to Hodgson and Lewis-Williams” (Froese et al, 2014), the authors mischaracterize the papers my colleague Paul Bahn and I have published criticizing the neuropsychological model first proposed by Lewis-Williams and Dowson in 1988. As I am far more familiar with our published statements than Froese et al, the purpose of this paper is to expose these distortions and misunderstandings of our work for the record, as well as to correct some factual errors with respect to neuropsychological phenomena in Froese et al (2014).…”

“…On p. 92 of Froese et al (2014), the authors state that “The skeptical arguments [critiquing Lewis-Williams and Dowson] have been spearheaded by Helvenston and Bahn (2003) who tried to demonstrate that [altered states of consciousness] ASCs could not have played a role for prehistoric art in Europe.” In the first place, we did not spearhead critiques of the neuropsychological model; many critics had done so prior to our first published papers in 2002 (see Bahn, 2001; Bednarik, 1988, 1990, 2013; Bradshaw, 2003; Frankfort & Hamayon, 2001; Hamayon, 2001; Hodgson, 2000, 2006a, 2006b; Hromnik, 1991; Le Quellec, 1999, 2001, 2004; Solomon 1997, 1999, 2001, to mention just a few).…”

“…Proponents of the neuropsychological model assume that early sensory deprivation experiments are analogous to the environment speleologists encounter in caves, and have shown great interest in the ASCs that occurred in the early sensory deprivation experiments when subjects were restrained for several days at a time. Froese et al (2014, p. 93) state that [in] “a recent review (Sacks, 2013, pp. 34–44), sensory deprivation regularly produces all kinds of visual hallucinations, including geometric patterns that are followed by more complex visual imagery.” They seem to be referring to the discussion of the findings of William Bexton and his colleagues (1954) and John Zubeck et al (1961).…”

“…No details of the type of hallucinations are available from that abstract. Given the variability of Bexton’s actual results, not a summary of the findings, Froese et al (2014), are obliged to describe the nature of these hallucinations in detail, as they cited this work as evidence for their claims that it is consistent with the neuropsychological model. I challenge them to do so.…”