Aquinas and Hauerwas on the Religious and the Secular

Abstract

This essay supports William Cavanaugh's thesis in The Myth of Religious Violence that the distinction between the "religious" and the "secular" is arbitrary. This essay also accepts the claim that this arbitrary distinction can be used to form unhelpful inversely-valued dichotomies for the sake of ideological or sectarian ends. However, the current essay seeks to show that this binary goes in the opposite direction as well. Sectarian outlooks of various kinds also postulate a strict and inversely valued dichotomy between the believing community and the world, where the former is the locus of truth and life and the latter, falsehood and death. Instead of this model of ethics, I commend an approach that upholds the prospect of concord between the believing community and the world, of the religious and the secular, even if these are somewhat inevitably arbitrary categories. In this approach, religious and civil loyalties are not pitted against each other, but rather exist on a continuum of provenance and perfection. KeywordsAquinas, Hauerwas, Cavanaugh, Virtue, SectarianismIn The Myth of Religious Violence, William Cavanaugh mounts a critique of an enlightenment narrative that postulates a strict and inversely valued dichotomy between the "religious" and the "secular," where the former is rejected as irrational and violent thus legitimating the so-called "rational" violence of the latter.1 This essay seeks to show that this binary goes in the opposite direction as well. Sectarian outlooks of various kinds also postulate a strict and inversely valued dichotomy between the believing community and the world, where the former is the locus of truth and life and the latter, falsehood and death. Instead of this model of ethics, I commend an approach that