Apropos of “Speciesist bias in AI: how AI applications perpetuate discrimination and unfair outcomes against animals”

Arandjelović, Ognjen

doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00255-4

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

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“…In particular, humans are highly social creatures and save for the rarest of exceptions, a major contributor to one's experience of life concerns their relationship with others (n.b. these others need not necessarily be humans but could involve any sentient beings whatsoever, such as dogs, cats, or other animals (McConnell et al, 2019;Arandjelović, 2023), or, in principle, artificial or alien sentience) (Lu and Shih, 1997;Camfield et al, 2009;Crossley and Langdridge, 2005;Brebner et al, 1995). Therefore, any hypothetical future life should take into account the experiences of the sentient beings that we feel sympathy for too, since our sympathetic apprehension of their experiences becomes part of our own subjective life experience.…”

Section: A Sentientist Hypostatization Of the Subjective Value Of Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Subjective Value of Life

Arandjelović¹

2023

Preprint

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Claims or the implicit assumption of the inherent worth of life are pervasive and remain virtually unchallenged. I have already argued that these outright moral dictates are thinly veiled vestiges of theological ethics which, following the removal of their theological foundations, remain little more than nebulous claims supported only by fear of the consequences of a challenge. In my previous work, I rejected an a priori claim of an objective life’s worth, which is the worth that we should assign to others’ lives, and elucidated a principled framework that gives rise to the said worth immediately, as a consequence of the experiences of its sentient environment. Herein, I address the complementary question of the value of one’s own life, which is the subjective value of life and, thus, Camus’s (in)famous view that “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide”. As before, I rejected the inherency of a life’s worth, showing it to be contradictio in adjecto, and instead show how this worth too can in large part be seen to emerge from sentient experiences of the subject. Many of these are innately linked to experiences of other sentient beings as objects, thus erecting a framework that is both principled and thoroughly humane with Schopenhauer’s ‘loving kindness’ running through it. Practically, my framework illuminates an understanding of suicide as a real-world phenomenon, helping those who remain living to understand a deceased one’s decision, and paving the way to answering questions, such as when there should be an attempt to prevent suicide, and what means of suicide prevention are ethically permissible.

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Section: A Sentientist Hypostatization Of the Subjective Value Of Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Subjective Value of Life

Arandjelović¹

2023

Preprint

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Speciesist bias in AI: a reply to Arandjelović

Hagendorff

Bossert²,

Fai

et al. 2023

AI Ethics

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The elimination of biases in artificial intelligence (AI) applications—for example biases based on race or gender—is a high priority in AI ethics. So far, however, efforts to eliminate bias have all been anthropocentric. Biases against nonhuman animals have not been considered, despite the influence AI systems can have on normalizing, increasing, or reducing the violence that is inflicted on animals, especially on farmed animals. Hence, in 2022, we published a paper in AI and Ethics in which we empirically investigated various examples of image recognition, word embedding, and language models, with the aim of testing whether they perpetuate speciesist biases. A critical response has appeared in AI and Ethics, accusing us of drawing upon theological arguments, having a naive anti-speciesist mindset, and making mistakes in our empirical analyses. We show that these claims are misleading.

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Apropos of “Speciesist bias in AI: how AI applications perpetuate discrimination and unfair outcomes against animals”

Cited by 2 publications

References 5 publications

On the Subjective Value of Life

On the Subjective Value of Life

Speciesist bias in AI: a reply to Arandjelović

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