Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line

Mei, Lili; Ye, Deshi; Zhang, Yong

doi:10.1007/s10878-016-0105-x

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…For example, the agents may have fractional preferences rather than approval preferences (that is, each agent may assign weights in [0, 1] to the facilities, instead of weights in {0, 1}). Other possible variants include settings in which some facilities are obnoxious (Mei, Ye, and Zhang 2018;Feigenbaum and Sethuraman 2015), meaning that agents would like to be far from them if they are built, and discrete settings in which the facilities can only be built at predefined locations on the line (e.g., see (Dokow et al 2012;Feldman, Fiat, and Golomb 2016;Ventre 2015, 2016)). Finally, an interesting generalization of our problem is when every facility comes at a different cost, and the objective is to maximize the social welfare by choosing and locating k facilities under the constraint that their accumulated costs is below a predefined budget.…”

Section: Conclusion and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Deligkas

Filos-Ratsikas

Voudouris

2022

AAAI

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We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three different settings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each setting, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results.

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Section: Conclusion and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Deligkas

Filos-Ratsikas

Voudouris

2022

AAAI

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show abstract

“…For example, the agents may have fractional preferences rather than approval preferences (that is, each agent may assign weights in [0, 1] to the facilities, instead of weights in {0, 1}). Other possible variants include se ings in which some facilities are obnoxious [Mei et al, 2018;Feigenbaum and Sethuraman, 2015], meaning that agents would like to be far from them if they are built, and discrete se ings in which the facilities can only be built at prede ned locations on the line (e.g., see [Dokow et al, 2012;Feldman et al, 2016;Ventre, 2015, 2016]). Finally, an interesting generalization of our problem is when every facility comes at a di erent cost, and the objective is to maximize the social welfare by choosing and locating 𝑘 facilities under the constraint that their accumulated costs is below a prede ned budget.…”

Section: Conclusion and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Deligkas¹,

Filos-Ratsikas²,

Voudouris³

2021

Preprint

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We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0, 1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three di erent se ings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each se ing, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results.

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“…In terms of preference of agents for a single facility, [Cheng et al, 2011] initiated obnoxious facility location games where agents want to be far away from the facility, followed by [Ibara and Nagamochi, 2012;Oomine and Nagamochi, 2016;Mei et al, 2018b]. [Zou and Li, 2015] and [Feigenbaum and Sethuraman, 2015] studied dual preference where agents have different preferences towards the single facility.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In terms of social objective, besides the mostly studied social cost/utility and maximum cost/utility, there are also other objectives studied like sum of square of distances [Feldman and Wilf, 2013;Mei et al, 2018b], difference of maximum distance and minimum distance (envy) [Cai et al, 2016].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

Yao

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2+1 to a ratio of 2.75.

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Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line

Cited by 9 publications

References 16 publications

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

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