Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

“…In their setting, the facilities are strategic and need to be compensated monetarily in order for them to be built; the goal is to maximize an aggregate objective given that the total payment is below a predefined budget. Besides these works, there is long literature of (homogeneous) facility location, studying different objectives (Alon et al 2010;Cai, Filos-Ratsikas, and Tang 2016;Feigenbaum, Sethuraman, and Ye 2013;Feldman and Wilf 2013), multiple facilities (Escoffier et al 2011;Fotakis and Tzamos 2013;Lu, Wang, and Zhou 2009;Lu et al 2010), different domains (Schummer and Vohra 2002;Tang, Yu, and Zhao 2020;Sui, Boutilier, and Sandholm 2013;Sui and Boutilier 2015), different cost functions (Filos-Ratsikas et al 2015;Fotakis and Tzamos 2016), and several interesting variants (Golomb and Tzamos 2017;Kyropoulou, Ventre, and Zhang 2019;Zhang and Li 2014;Filos-Ratsikas and Voudouris 2021). The very recent survey of Chan et al (2021) provides an excellent overview of the literature on mechanism design for facility location problems and the survey of Anshelevich et al (2021) provides an overview of the literature on distortion, which has been applied for analyzing facility location settings.…”

Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance

“…In another line of work, we initiated the study of distributed voting settings [39,40,41]. In contrast to centralized voting where there is a single pool of agents and we obtain direct access to the information provided by them, in distributed voting the agents are partitioned into disjoint groups and the mechanisms work in two steps: We first decide a representative alternative for each group by holding a local election for the agents therein, and then choose one of these representative alternatives as the overall winner.…”